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INTRODUCTION 
The historical progress of air power has shown a continuous 
rising trend. Military applications emerged fairly early in the 
infancy of aviation, in the form of first trials to establish the 
superiority of the third dimension over the battlefield. Well-
known examples include the balloon reconnaissance efforts made 
in France even before the birth of the aircraft, and it was not long 
before the first generation of flimsy, underpowered aircraft were 
being tested in a military environment. The Italians used aircraft 
for reconnaissance missions at Tripoli in 1910-1912, and the 
Americans made their first attempts at taking air power to sea as 
early as 1910-1911. 
Aviation technology was still taking its first steps in those 
times, however, and progress was hampered by all kinds of 
prejudices. Thus, when the First World War broke out, none of 
the combatant nations had any clear air doctrine or material 
readiness to assume dominance of the air. But once the initial 
experiences and results had been acquired, the development 
which had started gradually then accelerated at an astonishing 
tempo. Reconnaissance missions were again the natural first area 
of application for the new branch of the military services, and it 
proved so successful, and on the other hand so annoying, that 
some kind of anti-aircraft action was needed. The first weapons, 
personal pistols issued to the pilots or navigators, were soon 
replaced by heavier weapons, mainly machine guns mounted 
over the upper wing or shooting backwards from the rear cockpit. 
The most decisive instrument of airborne warfare, the fighter, 
had been born. 
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The problem with the first fighters was to create an effective 
and accurate way of shooting forwards from behind the propeller. 
One solution was a pusher engine, but aircraft of this type seemed 
to suffer in agility and speed. A French Lieutenant by the name 
of Garros then introduced a straightforward innovation; he 
mounted metal wedges on the propeller blades and shot through 
the rotating propeller. The bullets hitting the blades ricocheted 
aside, and although the propeller lost some of its efficiency, the 
first breakthrough in air combat had been made. Soon came 
Anthony Fokker's synchronized machine gun, air battles became 
fierce and the first aces emerged. Along with the development of 
new aircraft types and weaponry, new applications of air power 
grew up, and by the end of the First World War practically all the 
contemporary methods of air warfare were already in use. In 
addition to fighter and reconnaissance missions, bomber and 
ground attack operations were being carried out, and even the 
first interceptions from an aircraft carrier were being made. By 
the final phase of the war, top speeds had risen to about 200 
kilometres per hour, maximum altitudes to about 6000 metres 
and the engine sizes to between 200 and 400 h.p. 
The aviation technology had opened up quite new 
possibilities for military applications of flying by the time the 
Second World War broke out, but again air doctrines were 
premature and it was only through the experiences of war that 
commanders learned the right priorities and were able to develop 
the right kind of material and equipment. Air superiority proved 
to be of overwhelming importance, and the need for concentrated, 
flexible air operations became apparent. By the end of the war 
the speeds of propeller aeroplanes was about 600 kilometres per 
hour, they were flying at over 10,000 metres and engine power 
was in excess of 2000 h.p. Some types of jet aircraft had also 
become operational, with top speeds of about 900 km/h, and the 
basic structure of contemporary surveillance and control systems 
was already in existence. 
The Cold War, with its accent on nuclear weapons, directed 
military aviation technology into a rather narrow planning sector. 
Strategic nuclear bombers on the offensive side and supersonic 
interceptors with missile weaponry on the defensive side 
dominated both operational and technical thinking. High and 
fast were the keywords of the day, and traditional fighter virtues 
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such as agility and cannon power were dropped. But once more 
the doctrine was far removed from the reality. The various wars 
and conflicts taking place in the real world fairly soon taught 
people the lessons which had actually been there to be learned 
all the time. Air superiority had to be won before any other 
successful operations could be carried out, and it had to be won 
with fighters. The fighter pilots had to master combat tactics and 
manoeuvring, and the fighter planes had to be capable of both 
interception and dogfight. 
The Persian Gulf War was the first in which air strategy, 
training and equipment were on a level with technology (cruise 
missiles and stealth included) and the objectives of the war,2'3 but 
this applied only to one side, the coalition. This was why the 
final result and the pace with which it was achieved were so 
overwhelming. 
From its futile start just over eighty years ago, air power 
has become the dominant factor in warfare,3 and therefore every 
nation interested in guaranteeing its independence and 
sovereignty, has to take a hard look at its air defences and make 
sure that its forces are well trained, modern and ready to take up 
the challenges of an always insecure future. This overview will 
be concerned with the air defence status of Northern Europe. It 
examines first the general role of air power, then its historical 
development, followed by contemporary solutions and the future 
expectations of selected countries. For the reasons of scope it is 
limited, in alphabetical order, to Finland, Norway, the north-
western part of Russia and Sweden. Much of the text is based on 
the author's unofficial files, collected from various public sources. 
The Role of Air Power 
Like the technical development of aviation itself, the 
strategic value of the air power has been increasing steadily and 
continuously. Also, like technology, it has been a target of many 
suspicions and prejudices. Probably the most widely known case 
is the court-martial in 1925 of General Mitchell, who forecast the 
increasing value of air power and arranged a bombing test which 
was so successful that, ironically, he lost his job and his rank. 
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Air operations were helpful in the First World War but not 
decisive. The continuous flow of information acquired by photo 
and visual reconnaissance flights for the support of intelligence 
and targeting proved to be invaluable, and air superiority was 
essential for various operations, but it was not yet a prerequisite 
for success on land or at sea. The bombing raids were of little 
military importance, due to the limited payloads, but they had 
some psychological effect, especially among the civilian 
population, and the ground attacks used in the latter part of the 
war lacked any real punch because of the small calibre of the 
guns and grenade-sized bombs. Nevertheless, air operations had 
proved their value in battle and no intelligent commander could 
imagine facing a fully equipped enemy without air assets. On the 
other hand, most of the high-ranking officers still regarded air 
actions as hobbies for enthusiasts who were bringing some rather 
disturbing ideas into the military community. 
The Second World War led to a vast transformation in 
terms of both attitudes and results. The major powers had different 
philosophies regarding warfare in the about the air. Germany 
and the Soviet Union maintained their air forces in tactical roles, 
while the USA and Great Britain started to widen their scope to 
include strategic missions. One new feature became common 
everywhere in the course of the war: that air superiority, or the 
ability to deny one's opponent air superiority in the critical phases 
of operations, proved to be necessary in order to carry on any 
land or sea operation. This was true from the standpoint of both 
defence and offence. 
One of the defence examples that has been spoken and 
written about most is the Battle of Britain. After the rapid 
capitulation of the Low Countries and France, Germany was 
ready to conquer Great Britain, whose land defence was in ruins 
after the hasty evacuation from Dunkirk. However, there was 
still one obstacle before Operation Seelöwe could be launched. 
Air superiority over the channel and southern England was 
deemed necessary for this complicated sea and land effort. 
Germany regarded this as a fairly easy task after the Luftwaffe's 
quick victories in Poland, Holland, Belgium and France, but the 
Royal Air Force had already started its preparations for defence 
during the French campaign, refusing to commit any more forces 
to that lost cause and setting about strengthening its fighter 
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defence. One great advantage, the importance of which the 
Germans underestimated, was the home chain radar network, 
which gave the RAF a means of early warning and effective 
ground control. The number of trained pilots became the critical 
factor for Great Britain. The margin was extremely narrow, but it 
survived the test, and the invasion plan was shelved; for ever, in 
fact. The fighter pilots had saved the country and Churchill 
pronounced his famous words: "Never in the field of human 
conflict was so much owed by so many to so few." 
Famous examples of offensive actions include the Battle of 
Midway in the Pacific War and the Normandy invasion and 
subsequent attack on Germany. Once Japan and Germany were 
no longer able to deny their opponents air superiority, final 
defeat was only a question of time. 
In the course of the Second World War air power 
consolidated its status as an equal military branch with the others, 
and in many countries it was only after that that the air force 
became independent and its leadership could properly apply the 
methods called for by the special characteristics of air operations. 
More importantly, it was only then that the political leadership 
of many countries realized that air power would be a dominant 
factor in security policy in the future and was prepared to invest 
in it to any substantial extent. History since that time has shown 
that these investments were justified, and the countries concerned 
have come out on top in most subsequent wars and political 
conflicts. 
The conflicts that have occurred since the Second World 
War have been very variable in scale and nature, and therefore 
also in the use made of air power. The Korean War was a small-
scale extension of the Second World War in a sense, in which jet 
fighters dominated the sky and the United Nations' troops 
typically made heavy use of close supporting fire from the air 
even in the case of pinpoint targets on the front line. Military 
success in the various short skirmishes in the Middle-East was 
also closely connected with the ability to maintain air superiority. 
The Vietnam War was probably the most seriously misinterpreted 
campaign in military history. The misuse of military power, and 
especially of air power in this case, was in many circles, including 
professional ones, wrongly understood as underlining the 
unsuitability of the equipment and incompetence of the 
organizations, which had actually been given a military task 
without permission to carry it out by sound military methods. 
Tactically, however, Vietnam opened the eyes of the fighter 
community throughout the world and caused both training and 
fighter technology planning to return to the right priorities, which 
had been somewhat forgotten in the shadow of the Cold War. 
The extreme ends of the scale of air operations are guerilla 
warfare on the one hand and air strikes on the other. The former 
leave little room for high technology participation in isolated 
skirmishes fought out with small arms, whereas air strikes are 
the ultimate display of air power in which the only active 
combatant unit on the offensive is the air component. The objective 
usually is to destroy a limited target or to enact some form of 
political punishment by eliminating a system or function 
belonging to one's opponent. Air strikes typically involve a high 
level of training and a sophisticated level of weapons technology. 
The Gulf War was a new turning point in military history. 
Where air superiority had become a prerequisite for carrying out 
land and sea operations in the Second World War, the continuing 
upward trend in development had now reached the point where 
air superiority was a prerequisite for winning the war. The 
decisiveness of the air operations from the point of the initiative 
as a whole and the final result of the campaign was proved with 
exceptional clarity. It should be remembered that the defeated 
party possessed formidable forces, including a large army with 
modern equipment and weaponry. What was lacking was the 
right philosophy of air warfare and an appreciation of the 
decisiveness of air power. Without knowing it, the Iraqi leadership 
was doomed to lose the war before they had even started it. 
Many of the countries belonging to the coalition were ones 
that had witnessed the rise of air power from the early days, and 
neither the manner of operation nor the outcome was any surprise 
for their leaders and managers, in fact it was to be anticipated on 
the basis of the pre-war simulations and exercises. The biggest 
surprise, in effect, was the low casualty rate among friendly 
forces. 
On the other hand, the prompt results achieved by air 
operations were too much for the conservative officer cadre in 
some countries, and all manner of "nuts and bolts" explanations 
were developed to play down the overall effectiveness of the air 
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component, mainly related to the environment, the landscape, 
unsatisfactory probabilities of hitting the designated targets, 
weather and so on. However, there was no avoiding the truth 
that if a party to a modern conventional war is not capable of 
fighting successfully in the air, he no longer has fighting units 
but only target units. No two wars are alike, and the tempo of 
operations, loss rates, geographical and weather conditions etc. 
can vary on wide scale, but that one unavoidable truth will 
remain. 
The high value of air power has tempted many into both 
false expectations and mismanagement. The contemporary 
conflict in Bosnia is one example of a situation which is difficult 
in terms of international crisis management. There are so many 
parties involved, the causes and motives are complicated, and 
there are no strategic advantages to encourage a commitment 
from outside. A certain mishandling of the problem of the Vietnam 
type was discernible in the United Nations' attitude when 
threatening the Bosnian Serbs with air strikes if they failed to 
observe the cease-fire agreement. The goal of the operation was 
obviously unclear, the target priorities were arguable and the 
will to carry out effective, destructive raids was lacking. The 
Serbs interpreted it as representing the familiar pattern of tough 
talk followed by back-pedalling and inaction. As a senior staff 
member at RAND, Dr. Lambeth, said: "If you want to send a 
message, use Western Union."4 
Finally, the more solid NATO commitment brought the 
use of air power closer to the right principles. The parties in the 
conflict were given a foretaste of a real determination to use air 
strikes as military methods for eliminating unyielding elements 
in the game, by hitting command bunkers, radar and control 
centres, munitions and ammunition storages and bridges, rather 
than indefinitely warning the stubborn players. This worked, for 
the Bosnian Serbs realized through these examples that if NATO 
was serious and ignored human shields and revenge casualties 
on the ground, the Serbs would no longer be anything more than 
sitting targets. This led to conclusion of the most promising 
peace agreement so far, although the deep wounds already made 
will still need an indefinite time to heal. 
The mismanagement of air power is an old military sin, and 
astonishingly enough, effort in this direction continue to pop up 
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time after time in military circles. Perhaps the most colorful 
description about the desire to control the air power is given by 
Gregory Boyington, who was one of the American voluntary pilots 
with the "Flying Tigers" in China in 1942. There was his boss 
Chennault plus General Stilwell and another general, who both 
outranked his boss but were still without combat troops of their 
own. Tells Boyington:" The manner in which these three argued 
over control of this handful of pilots impressed me much the same 
as three whores would have - arguing over their virginity. The 
combined stars upon their own shoulders were as numerous as the 
combat pilots they happened to be arguing about. And apparently 
we pilots weren't to be consulted."45  
The correct concept has been learned by the always reliable 
try and error method in numerous wars, but peacetime formality 
often pushes the lessons of the real world into the background. 
Air Marshall Tedder's words that "the aircraft doesn't know any 
other boundaries on land or sea than those which are dictated by 
its radius of action", give a clue to the right principle. Concentrated 
control of forces, decentralized and flexible operational systems 
and coordination with other branches are the key to the correct 
management model. In the dynamic, three-dimensional conflicts 
of today, and especially those of the future, all branches are 
important, and good cooperation between their highly specialized 
leaderships is essential. There are still some officers who are 
speaking of a "main" branch, implying some permanent priority 
status. Such statements tell us more about the speaker than about 
the subject. The role of each branch depends on the situation, and 
the main role can change many times during a prolonged 
campaign. The only branch that is able to claim some kind of 
permanent main role is the air force, for it is the only one capable 
of purely independent operation. The others will always need air 
support in any major action. 
The strategic value of the control in the air will increase 
further in the future, and with it the role of air power as a whole, 
and thus air defence will be crucial to any country's effort to deter 
violations and avoid crises in its territory and airspace. 
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AIR POWER BEFORE WORLD WAR II 
Finland 
The Finnish Air Force was founded on 6 March 1918, and its first 
aircraft was donated by a Swedish count, Erik von Rosen, and 
bore his own personal insignia, blue swastikas, painted on its 
wings. This was the origin of the first official Finnish Air Force 
markings, which thus have nothing to do with the Nazi swastikas 
of the 1930s. 
There was one exceptional feature in the founding of the 
FAF, that it was organized right from the start as an independent 
branch of the armed forces. This foresight on the part of the 
Supreme Commander, Mannerheim, created a good basis for its 
development and made it one of the oldest air forces in the 
world. 
The FAF flew its first combat operations in the War of 
Independence in 1918, its main missions being reconnaissance 
sorties, with equipment that included a modest total of 19 Thulin 
Parasol, Albatros, Friedrichshafen, Rumpler, D.F.W.C.V and 
Nieuport aircraft.' 
In summer 1918, after the War of Independence was over, 
the FAF was organized into five air stations, of which three acted 
as training centres as well. Because of the enormous number of 
lakes in the country, sea planes were regarded as the most suitable 
type of aircraft, thus four out of the five air stations were in effect 
sea plane harbours. All of the stations were located in southern 
Finland, as their main mission was surveillance and in this way 
the network served well to cover the Gulf of Finland and Lake 
Ladoga areas. The total number of aircraft was increased to 31, 
representing 14 different types.6 This variety was to prove a 
fairly permanent problem in later times, especially for the FAF 
technicians. 
New proposals were made in the early 1920s to organize 
and strengthen the Finnish Air Force in order to be ready to take 
up the challenges emerging in international military aviation. 
The Commander drew up a development plan according to which 
the FAF should have 15 fighter squadrons, 10 reconnaissance 
squadrons, 8 ground attack squadrons and 8 bomber squadrons, 
to a planned total of 315 aircraft. A competing plan devised by 
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British specialists put greater emphasis on the offensive 
squadrons, especially sea planes.' The small number of existing 
air bases, the ubiquitous presence of lakes and the dominance of 
sea operations in a British context had obviously left their mark. 
The FAF Commander's plan was much more up to date than the 
British proposal, but the real arbitrator proved to be the lack of 
resources, which effectively compromised any development 
plans. 
The next attempt was made around 1930, when a plan for 
17 squadrons was proposed, with a total of 221 aircraft.' This had 
been influenced by the international trend which favoured an 
offensive role for military air power. The earlier predominance 
of fighter aircraft in planning had relax to create some room for 
bombers as well. Air warfare was still too distant a subject for 
either the military or political leadership to appreciate, however, 
and yet one more plan was more or less buried. The total 
complement of the FAF in the early 1930s remained at around 80 
aircraft. 
When General C.G.E. Mannerheim in 1931 was appointed 
Chairman of the Defence Committee in Finland, he initiated a 
thorough investigation into the status of the Finnish Defence 
Forces. He was one of the military leaders who foresaw the 
importance of air operations in future wars and therefore set 
about improving the combat potential of the Air Force. The 
international fashion for bomber dominance was criticized by a 
group of fighter pilots, who started to oppose the offensive 
ideology and to emphasis the importance of air defence in any 
future war. They were able to achieve positive results in the 
priorities assigned to the purchase programmes, to the extent 
that the five-year programme of 1937 included 11 squadrons 
comprising 81 fighters, 27 bombers, 52 reconnaissance and light 
ground attack planes for liason with the army and 13 maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft.6 War was about to break out by this 
time, however, and the armament programme was very much 
unfinished. Even so, the fighter leaders had developed and 
practised a Finnish blend of fighter tactics which proved to be 
justified in the harsh test of air combat.' The use of formation 
tactics and emphasis on individual precision in air-to-air gunnery 
were important force multipliers against the superior numbers 
of the enemy. 
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The organization of the FAF in 1938 was:' 
- Air Force Headquarters, Helsinki 
- 1 Wing 
- Staff, Suur-Merijoki 
-10, 12, 14 and 16 Reconnaissance squadrons, Vyborg and 
Sortavala 
-2 Wing 
- Staff, Utti 
- 24 and 26 Fighter squadrons, Utti 
-3 Wing 
- Staff, Immola 
- 44 and 46 Bomber squadrons, Immola 
- 36 Maritime squadron, Santahamina (Helsinki) 
- Air Academy, Kauhava 
- Technical School, Santahamina (Helsinki) 
- Air Depot, Tampere 
The State Aircraft Factory in Tampere had planned and 
manufactured several original aircraft types and was building 
Fokker DXXI fighters and Blenheim bombers, for example, under 
licence. 
When the Winter War began on 30th November 1939, the 
FAF had altogether 114 aircraft in its possession, but almost a 
half of these were obsolescent. Thus the nation was placing its 
pilots in a most difficult defence position. Their motivation and 
fighting spirit were high, however, and the training provided in 
both the FAF and the voluntary Air Defence Association gave a 
good boost to their morale. Also, the people at large lent both 
psychological and material support. The various collections of 
money by students and other groups materialized in the form of 
donations of aircraft to the Air Force, and a special Academic Air 
Defence Organization was founded in addition to the existing 
Air Defence Association to support the Air Force.' 
Anti-aircraft artillery was first considered by the Finnish 
Defence Forces in 1921, when an artillery committee considering 
anti-aircraft defence decided that 21 batteries were needed to 
protect the front-line troops at the centre of the defence. This 
proposal did not lead to any action by the general staff, however, 
and remained in existence on paper only.8 
The next time that the question of anti-aircraft artillery was 
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raised was in a meeting of the Defence Rationalization Committee 
on 26th November 1923. The need to organize this new branch of 
artillery and acquire the proper weaponry was identified and 
calculations of the material needed in wartime were made.8 
AAA training started on 1st July 1924, and the first anti-
aircraft battery was founded on 18th June 1926. By 1928 three 
anti-aircraft batteries were ready, belonging to the coastal and 
field artillery divisions. This arrangement caused certain 
discrepancies in cooperation over training methods and 
development priorities, and thus the three batteries were 
eventually combined in 1930 to form an anti-aircraft artillery 
battalion, which then became an anti-aircraft artillery regiment 
in 1934. Purchases of anti-aircraft weapons were small, however, 
and lagged behind the development plans. 
An additional separate Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion was 
founded at Suomenlinna (Helsinki) in 1938, and all anti-aircraft 
troops were subordinated to the Air Force. The basis for an 
integrated air defence system had been created and the principles 
for its organization had been brought up to date, but for practical 
reasons, considering the time needed for equipping, training and 
fine tuning a technologically complex branch of arms, these 
actions had come too late. The anti-aircraft artillery was still 
materially in an early phase of its development in the autumn of 
1939.8 Since aircraft purchases had also been slow on account of 
the general underdeveloped nature of the defence funding, it 
was no wonder that the war was to face both the political and 
military leadership with a rude awakening. 
Norway 
Military aviation in Norway began in the spring of 1912, when 
the Stortinget donated funds for Norwegians to participate in 
flying training in France. The first group included three Army 
officers and one from the Navy. A group of Norwegians who 
lived in France donated them a two-seater Farman reconnaissance 
plane. After two month's training, the officers gained their pilot's 
licences and returned to Norway. The aircraft, called "Ganger 
Rolf", was flown to Hedmarken and the flight served as a 
reconnaissance mission in connection with an autumn military 
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exercise. The army built its first air station at Kjeller, where two 
more Farman donations were located.12 
In April 1912 five Navy officers bought a German single-
seater Taube aeroplane. At first it took off from a field, but later it 
was installed on pontoons and moved to Horten. This sea plane, 
given the name "Start", was transferred to the state inventory, 
and marked the beginning of naval aviation.12 
Aviation attracted increasing interest once the First World 
War had broken out. The Army and Navy both established their 
own aircraft factories, and both branches also had their own 
flying schools. 
Both factories manufactured several original Norwegian 
models of aircraft during the 1920s and 1930s, and many foreign 
types were also built under licence.12 
The Army Flying Corps and the Navy Flying Corps lived 
more or less separate lives in the years between the wars, for it 
was believed at that time that the Navy and Army had quite 
different needs. Navy pilots shared responsibility for the defence 
of the coast, while the Army Flying Corps mainly operated 
observation planes and a dispatch service for Army units in the 
interior.13 
The question of whether there should be one or two flying 
corps had been discussed during World War I and was brought up 
repeatedly over the years leading up to World War II without any 
final decision being made. In the mid-1930s the Army had a total of 
72 front line aircraft, including Gloster Gladiator fighters, and the 
Navy had 64 pontoon planes. When World War II broke out in 
1939, the Norwegian Armed Forces had already ordered new, 
modern fighters, but they had not yet been delivered. The Navy 
had received six Heinkel 115 torpedo bombers,13 and the Army had 
an organized air defence consisting of over twenty anti-aircraft 
artillery batteries.18 The post-World War I trend of international 
pacifism, which left Europe very vulnerable and became one of the 
major causes of the Second World War by giving Hitler his initial 
easy, victories, had also had some effect in Norway, in addition to 
which the separation and subordinate positions of the two flying 
corps did not provide the best possible basis for considering seriously 
the special characteristics of air warfare. Thus the air defence system 
was not tuned to maximum readiness when the Germans mounted 
their surprise attack on 9th April 1940. 
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Russian Empire/Soviet Union14  
The first military aviation schools in Russia were established at 
Sevastopol, in the Crimea, and at Gatchina, near St. Petersburg, 
in 1910, and the branch continued to develop between then and 
August 1st, 1914, when Germany declared war on Russia, but 
too slowly to meet the demands of a major war. During the pre-
war period Russian military commanders preferred to purchase 
French aircraft such as Farmans and Nieuports, and they also 
acquired planes from Britain, Germany and the United States, 
but in smaller numbers. American Curtiss hydroplanes became 
popular in the naval air units after 1911, however. Domestic 
production was limited to foreign types, except for a few designs 
produced in St. Petersburg. Up to 1913, when Sikorsky 
demonstrated his four-engined transport plane, "The Grand", 
weighing 9,000 lbs, the aircraft consisted of single-engine biplanes 
and monoplanes, for most aviation specialists considered larger 
models impracticable. By the outbreak of war the Imperial Air 
Force had acquired two four-engined Sikorsky planes. 
The Russian aviation industry grew from a few small 
factories in 1910 to a total of from ten to sixteen airframe and 
aircraft engine manufacturers during World War I, employing 
10,000 workers and technicians. The foundations of the industry 
in Russia were laid by French firms and French capital, but most 
of the factories were hardly more than workshops. The largest 
comprised the French firm of Duks, founded in Moscow in 1910, 
the Russian-Baltic plant in St. Petersburg; and the Gnome Rhone 
engine plant, built by a French company in Moscow in 1912. 
Following the outbreak of World War I, the Russian 
Government made greater efforts to expand and modernize 
military aviation. One Western European source of information 
maintains that a total of 1,769 airframes and 660 aircraft engines 
had been built by 1916, and another reports that Russia produced 
from 1,500 to 2,000 planes in 1917. One Soviet source has stated 
that the average output during World War I was from 230 to 380 
planes a month, but reports from American observers in Russia 
at the time suggest a lower approximate figure, indicating that 
from 800 to 1,000 aircraft were built in 1917. In any case, total 
wartime production has been estimated at about 4,700 aircraft. 
The disintegration of the combat capabilities of the Russian 
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armed forces, including the Imperial Air Force, began during the 
early months of 1917. Following the March Revolution, which 
transferred power to Prince Lvov and later to Kerensky, air 
operations gradually came to a standstill. 
Almost immediately after the overthrow of the Kerensky 
government, the Bolsheviks determined to establish a military 
air force to defend their victory in the October Revolution and, 
wherever possible, to extend its scope. Many of the political and 
military leaders of the new regime, including Lenin, were 
apparently impressed with the potential value of air power, not 
only as a military weapon to be used against both foreign and 
domestic enemies but also as a political and economic means of 
consolidating and expanding the Soviet system. Although the 
obstacles were formidable, circumstances provided later 
opportunities for political and military expansion, many of which 
the Soviet leaders exploited. 
The first attempts to organize aviation units were made 
within the disintegrating structure of the Czarist Army and Navy 
and through local soviets, revolutionary committees and military 
bureaus. Petrograd and Moscow were the principal centres for 
the formation of the first Red Air Fleet elements from the 
beginning, however, and the centralizing authority emanating 
from Petrograd at first and later, after March 1918, from Moscow, 
asserted control over the local initiatives and prepared the way 
for the establishment of a Central Administration of Workers 
and Peasants Air Fleet. 
The principle of collective leadership was retained until 
1924. A Field Administration of the Air Fleet was established in 
September 1918 and attached to the Revolutionary Military 
Council, but the Air Fleet was not directly represented on the 
Council for several years. The Field Administration exercised 
operational command over all air units of the Red Army. 
The total number of aircraft in units of the Red Air Fleet 
increased from about 140 in July 1918 to 350 by the end of 1920, 
when the Civil War ended in western Russia, although a great 
many planes were unserviceable by that time. By the time the 
Japanese left Vladivostok in October 1922 the number had risen 
to about 400 planes. From December 1920 to the end of 1922, 
Russian aircraft strength was replenished primarily by imports 
from Germany, Italy and Holland, and possibly also from Britain, 
as well as by the production of Russian models based on foreign 
types. The aircraft importation programme begun at that time 
received priority attention during the succeeding NEP (New 
Economic Policy) period, and by the end of 1922 it was possible 
to assign several hundred planes that had survived World War I 
to training schools and units in the interior. 
Aircraft imported during 1921 and 1922 included Italian 
Savoyas, Ansaldos and Balillas, Dutch Fokkers and German 
Junkers, and possibly some English De Havillands, Avros, 
Martinsydes and Vickers. About 100 Ansaldo single-seater and 
two-seater aircraft were delivered to Moscow by Italian pilots at 
the end of 1922. Fokker F-3 aircraft were used on the Moscow-
Königsberg route after 1921 by the newly formed Russian-German 
civil transport company called Deruluft. German-Soviet military 
collaboration increased in scope and concentration from 1919 
and 1920 onwards, and had greater impact on the development 
of the Red Army, the Air Fleet and the aviation industry, 
particularly after the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922. At that time, the 
German policy of collaboration with Russia, partly camouflaged 
as unofficial commercial relations and based on Bismarck's old 
policy of friendship for the East, was viewed by the German 
Reichswehr and elements of the Foreign Office as a military and 
political necessity in view of the onerous terms of the Treaty of 
Versailles. Both Germany and Russia had become outlaws in the 
community of nations. The Reichswehr established a "base" in 
Russia for the development of German military power, primarily 
artillery and aviation and chemical and mechanized warfare, 
and the military and economic strengthening of Russia as an ally 
of Germany was a concomitant of this eastward orientation. Red 
aviation benefited remarkably in organization, training and 
technology in this way. 
During the decade that included the NEP and the first Five 
Year Plan (1929-33), the Soviet regime strengthened the 
foundations of the state and thus enabled fundamental 
improvements to be made in the size and operational capabilities 
of the military and civil air establishments. The needs of air 
power received the highest priority in the allocation of human 
and material resources. Assistance was procured from western 
Europe, especially Germany, whenever possible, however, and 
also from the United States. The more advanced "capitalistic" 
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nations of the West were still superior in air power in 1932, but 
the Russians were gradually cutting back their advantage. At the 
same time, they skilfully used the potentialities of aviation to 
strengthen internal security, increase the prestige of Communism 
and support the long-term party program of international 
revolution. 
The Red Air Force (former Red Air Fleet) also acquired 
greater power and influence in military councils under Red Army 
control. The principal organization directing it was still the 
Revolutionary Military Council, a collective body through which 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces controlled the Air 
Force of the Red Army and by which the Red Army General Staff 
and the military districts and separate armies, with their air force 
components, were ultimately governed. 
Until about 1928, the Red Air Force field organization was 
subject to frequent experiments, which were usually carried out 
only in part before being superseded by others. The units first 
included a mixed variety of new detachments and squadrons, as 
well as some groups dating from the civil war period. Some were 
numbered and others bore names, e.g. the "Lenin Squadron". 
The Red Air Force squadron became the principal tactical 
formation with a fixed establishment. There were two or three 
detachments, or flights, in each squadron, each of which contained 
two or three sections. Squadron strength varied considerably 
because of shortages and the variety of types available; the normal 
numbers were from eighteen to thirty-one. Some squadrons, 
independent flights of similar composition and groups were 
subordinate to the naval fleets. 
The number of aircraft in Red Air Force units rose from 
more than 400 to about 1,080 between 1923 and 1928, over 800 
having been purchased abroad. Although only 10% of the aircraft 
were less than three years old in 1923, about 600 could be 
considered reasonably new by 1928, at which stage the Soviet air 
force was about equal in strength to that of Great Britain. 
, Aircraft strength increased to about 1,300 in 1931, rose to 
1,500 after Japan occupied Manchuria, and may well have reached 
2,200 by the end of 1932, in anticipation of possible conflict. At 
that time bombers constituted over 30% of the total force, the 
remainder comprising mainly fighters, including two-seater 
planes, some attack fighters, numerous other aircraft to be used 
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in direct support of ground forces, more modern seaplanes, 
amphibians, transports and trainers. A large bomber was 
introduced in 1931. Influenced by the doctrines of the Italian 
General Douhet, who advocated an independent bomber force 
for strategic air attack, the Red Air Force continued to rely 
substantially on such aircraft until the political purges of 1936 
and 1937. 
Aircraft of Soviet design entered production especially 
during the years 1930-1932. These comprised mostly the 
reconnaissance or multipurpose aircraft designated R-1, R-3 and 
R-6, which were used in tactical units, and the I-series single-
seater biplane fighters, notably the 1-2, I-3,1-4 and 1-6. 
By 1934 and 1935 the collegiate principle of command had 
been eliminated throughout the entire Soviet military 
organization, and both the Council of Labour and Defence and 
the Revolutionary Military Council had been abolished. Although 
the command and organization of the Red Air Force had improved 
in the 1930's, the Red Army continued to exercise effective control 
over air power, which was viewed chiefly as an instrument for 
supporting the ground forces. This meant that unit quantities 
were emphasized at the expense of the quality factors needed in 
air warfare. 
The trend towards more conventional patterns of military 
organization lasted only until the political purges of spring 1937, 
however, which led to reintroduction of the commissar system 
and of organs of collective control, including military soviets at 
high command levels. More than 50% of the highest-ranking Air 
Force officers, including the commander-in-chief, were removed 
in the purges later that year. 
Air defence, called PVO, received increasing attention 
during this period, particularly in the late 1930's. Additional 
PVO fighter squadrons were assigned to defend important cities 
and industrial centres, in conjunction with anti-aircraft artillery 
under the High Command, barrage balloons and supporting 
units. Warnings for the whole air defence system were provided 
by an organization called VNOS, which was divided into 
battalions and companies in 1937. The PVO fighter squadrons 
and anti-aircraft artillery battalions, under the command of either 
an air defence district chief or the commander of a military 
district, were attached to military district brigades for support 
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and training. It was only in later years that a fighter-interceptor 
command was formed in the Red Air Force. 
During the Second Five Year Plan the number of aircraft 
rose from about 2,000 to more than 5,400, the figure reached in 
1938, of which approximately 4,200 were considered first-line 
planes in 1937. Soviet fighters from 1937 on were primarily of the 
I-15 and I-16 types, designed by Polikarpov. The medium-sized 
bombers included the SB-2, SB-2 Bis and DB-3. 
The number of squadrons and brigades in the Red Air 
Force multiplied greatly from 1933 to 1939. The number of 
brigades rose from more than twenty-two to about fifty between 
1933 and 1935, including over two hundred squadrons. Brigade 
strength in 1938 was approaching sixty, not including seven or 
eight brigades engaged in naval aviation. The following year the 
number of brigades theoretically available must have been about 
eighty. 
When the Soviet Union attacked Finland on 30th November 
1939 it committed almost half of its total aircraft strength to the 
offensive. Since bombing operations played a great part in the air 
campaign plan, the proportion of the total available strength of 
Soviet bombers engaged over Finland was almost 50%. Each Red 
Army unit was supported by one or two air units of brigade size. 
Sweden 
Military aviation in Sweden began in the Navy in 1911 and in the 
Army in 1912, again through donations of aircraft. In the period 
from 1911 to 1917 the Army acquired a total of 42 aircraft, of 
which 12 were donated by individual persons or associations 
and the Navy obtained 22, of which 14 were donations." 
Sweden had 8 military aircraft, 4 in the Army and 4 in the 
Navy, and 20 military pilots at the time when the First World 
War broke out. The war in Europe with its air operations raised 
the question of a possible attack on Sweden from the air. The 
idea of a combined air organization was also raised, but weariness 
with military matters and a trust in "eternal peace" and the 
League of Nations buried these initiatives once the war was 
over.15 
The main concern of the politicians was to cut defence 
spendings. They considered organizing an independent Air Force 
as a mean of rationalizing the Armed Forces.48 So, when the 
question of a united air organization was raised again in 1924, 
the Riksdagen was ready to act. A positive decision was reached, 
and the second oldest independent air force in Northern Europe, 
Flygvapnet, came into being on 1st July 1926. Its initial 
organizational structure included four air stations, at Uppsala, 
Hägernäs, Malmen/Karlsborg and Ostersund, and one flying 
school, at Ljungbyhed. The aircraft included types such as 
Nieuport, Phönix, Albatros and Dront. The Fokker CV-E S 6 
became the standard reconnaissance plane for army purposes 
and the Heinkel He 5 S 5 for the same mission in naval operations. 
The Avro 504 and Albatros were eventually abandoned in favour 
of the Heinkel HD 35 Sk 6 as a trainer model at Ljungbyhed. The 
Air Force's own workshop, CVM, manufactured Fokker aircraft 
under licence at Malmslätt.16 
The goal for the 'first development phase' in 1926-1936 was 
a force of 230 combat aircraft, but the necessary resources were 
not granted, and thus the total number of combat aircraft in 1935 
was about 70 and the number of trainers about 10.16 
When the second development phase, for the period 1936-
1946, started, threatening signs were already visible in the 
international security environment. The new defence decision 
therefore included considerable improvements to Flygvapnet. 
The total number of wings in the organization was to be increased 
to seven, with one flying school: 
- F 1, bomber, Västerås 
- F 4, bomber, Frösön 
- F 6, bomber, Karlsborg 
- F 7, bomber, Såtenäs 
- F 8, fighter, Barkarby 
- F 2, naval torpedo and reconnaissance, Hägernäs 
- F 3, army reconnaissance, Malmslätt 
- F 5, flying school, Ljungbyhed 
In addition to the general staff, the wing organization included 
three divisions, each having 12 aircraft in bomber, army 
reconnaissance, torpedo and two navy reconnaissance units. One 
navy reconnaissance division had 8 aircraft, and the three fighter 
divisions each had 15 airplanes. Altogether the development 
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plan comprised 257 combat aircraft and about 80 trainer aircraft.16 
The effect of the international preference for bombers can clearly 
be seen in the very heavy dominance of the bomber wings in the 
development planning. 
The domestic aircraft industry also was considered very 
important in Sweden, and the Swedish Railway Workshop's 
Aircraft Division in Linköping and the new Swedish Aircraft 
Factory at Trollhättan carried out production under licence and 
eventually also generated some original designs." 
When the World War II broke out in September 1939, some 
progress had been made according to the plan, but it was only in 
its initial phase, of course. The total number of aircraft was about 
180, of which there were 40 Junkers Ju 86 B 3 bombers, 30 Hawker 
Hart B 4 light bombers, 50 Gloster Gladiator J 8 fighters, 25 
Fokker CV-E S 6 army reconnaissance aircraft, 25 Heinkel He 5 S 
5 maritime reconnaissance aircraft, 10 Heinkel He 115 T 2 torpedo 
aircraft and about 80 elementary and advanced trainers.16 The 
development of a fighter system had started only in that same 
year.17 
Anti-aircraft artillery was first regarded as a new specialized 
field artillery weapon system in Sweden in 1928, when an anti-
aircraft artillery regiment was established in Karlsborg. In 1937 
anti-aircraft artillery planning was strengthened by organizing a 
specialized department for it at Headquarters. The anti-aircraft 
artillery in Sweden was permanently organized within the Army.18 
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WORLD WAR II 
Finland 
The Winter War was the first real baptism of fire for the Finnish 
Air Force. The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed the famous 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in 1939, which resulted in the German 
attack on Poland in September of that year. This was followed on 
30th November of the same year by the Soviet Union's attack on 
Finland. 
The scarcity of Finland's material defence resources now 
became apparent, and there is no doubt that the FAF was ill-
prepared for the war from a material standpoint. At the beginning 
of the war there were only two fighter squadrons, and only one 
of those had even relatively modern aircraft, 40 Fokker D. XXIs, 
of which 36 were available to the squadron at the outbreak of 
war. The other squadron had 15 obsolete Bulldog biplanes, of 
which 10 could be mobilized.19 In addition, the two bomber 
squadrons had 18 Blenheim bombers altogether, and the 
reconnaissance and liaison units a total of 56 aircraft which would 
have belonged better in a museum than on a battlefield. The air 
defence artillery also lacked weaponry, so that only 11 heavy 
and 7 light batteries could be mobilized. The air defence machine-
gun companies should have had 120 light cannons and 120 
machine guns, but only 24 cannons, 70 air defence guns and 71 
infantry machine guns were available. Only 20 guns were 
available for protecting the air bases.8 
Air surveillance was well organized, but the sparse 
telephone network caused delays which badly hampered ground 
control for fighter interception and fire control for the air defence 
artillery.$ 
The level of training and motivation of the troops was 
high, however, and thus the same may be said of their readiness 
for combat. The FAF had already adopted up-to-date fighter 
tactics in 1935, while many other combatant countries, including 
the Soviet Union and Great Britain, for instance, only learned 
this approach later in the war. There are three basic things that 
made the Finnish fighter force successful:2' 
-The philosophy of loose, broad section and finger four formations 
which had been adopted in 1935. 
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-The emphasis on individual accuracy in air-to-air gunnery, which 
was trained for systematically. The Finnish fighter pilots were 
taught to shoot at certain parts of the target plane and not just at 
the plane in general. 
-The principle of attack regardless of numbers, which always 
gives one the advantage of initiative. 
A supporting factor was the individual freedom of action allowed 
inside the formation, the principle of "first see, first shoot", which 
applied to every pilot. This increased the effectiveness of the 
entire formation, cutting down delays and making every pilot an 
efficient shooter in a revolutionary way. Also, the small number 
of fighters had one benefit; before a new pilot was introduced to 
aerial combat he was tested in the front line squadron and then 
protected by the veterans through his first critical battles. As a 
result, the Fokker D.XXIs (FRs) were able to achieve an exchange 
ratio (kills in air combat versus losses in air combat) of 16:1 
against Soviet combat aircraft. This was spectacular considering 
that the Fokkers had fixed undercarriages, making them slow for 
bomber interception missions and clumsy against fighters in 
aerial combat. 
The bombers were used to cut the enemy's logistic 
communication lines and in long range photoreconnaissance 
missions. Due to the small number of planes, the bombing raids 
were more disturbing than destructive, but the reconnaissance 
results were invaluable for intelligence, mapping and artillery 
targeting. 
The obsolete reconnaissance biplanes and dive bombers 
suffered heavy losses at first, until the change was made to night 
tactics. They were then able to carry out continuous harassing 
bomb raids on the enemy logistic centres and transportation 
lines in addition to their standard reconnaissance missions. 
The lack of fighters was quickly realized within the nation 
at large, and prompt measures were initiated to increase the 
fighter force. Thus 92 fighters were purchased or received as 
donations during the Winter War, including Fiat G.50, Gloster 
Gladiator II and Morane-Saulnier M.S. 406 types. The best fighter 
acquired during the war, a Brewster B-239, came too late to 
participate in combat missions, and the same applied to the 10 
Hawker Hurricane I fighters.19 
I.1 
In addition to their normal duties the fighter squadrons, 
together with bombers, played a decisive role in ground attacks 
on the advancing enemy on the ice of the Bay of Vyborg in the 
final phase of the war. 
The anti-aircraft artillery was divided fairly evenly into 
home area and front line troops. As with the fighters, accelerated 
purchases of anti-aircraft guns started immediately, with the 
result that 9 Bofors 75 mm cannons from Sweden, 12 Breda 76 
mm cannons from Italy and 24 Vickers cannons from Great 
Britain were received in the course of the war, together with a 
great number of smaller-calibre cannons and machine guns and 
the necessary ammunition.$ 
The majority of the field army anti-aircraft units were 
located in the rear section of the army on the Karelian Isthmus, 
an area that was consequently fairly well protected. These units 
also achieved good results in causing losses to the enemy in the 
air. Many of the home area units, on the other hand, had only 
small-calibre guns which were unable to reach the flying altitudes 
of the enemy bombers.8 
In Lapland there was a Swedish flying unit F 19, an anti-
aircraft company and an anti-aircraft artillery battery operating 
on voluntary basis; 5'8 and these units played an important role in 
the defence of the region, for even though enemy operations in 
the north were minor compared with the main offensive, it would 
have been impossible to leave these areas totally unprotected. 
Thanks to the Swedish voluntary units, all the Finnish air defence 
resources could be concentrated on repelling the main Soviet 
attack. 
The Soviet order of battle in the Winter War enjoyed a ten-
fold superiority in numbers over the Finnish Defence Forces, and 
this meant that Finland was forced to yield ground in Karelia. 
On the other hand, the Soviet offensive was brought to a stop 
and heavy casualties were inflicted on the attacker. Germany 
was hostile at that stage, however, Sweden was officially strictly 
neutral and the support plans drawn up by France and Great 
Britain proved inadequate, so that Finland simply did not have 
the resources to continue the fight alone. A peace treaty was 
signed on the evening of 12th March 1940 and came into effect 
the following day. This included a revision of the national border 
west of Lake Ladoga. 
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Finland's strategic position became increasingly difficult. 
The Soviet Union continued its diplomatic pressure and Foreign 
Minister Molotov, on a trip to Germany in November 1940, 
demanded that the "Finland problem" must be resolved for 
good. The country's closest supporters, France and Great Britain, 
were themselves embroiled in the war and in an ironic twist of 
fate, the Finns found that the only nearby country with whom 
they could trade to improve their defence status was the Soviet 
Union's former ally, Germany, which was at that time prepared 
its eastern offensive. 
From a political point of view Finland did not want to be 
involved in an alliance with Nazi Germany, but from a military 
standpoint cooperation seemed to be the only possible solution. 
But despite numerous requests by Germany to advance their 
forces beyond the demarcation line drawn through Eastern 
Karelia, for an attack on Leningrad, the Finns refused to do this. 
When Germany began its eastern offensive against the 
Soviet Union in June 1941, Finland had already given that country 
permission to stage units through Lapland, and after Soviet 
bombers had attacked various targets in Finland on 25th June 
1941, the Finns officially entered into military cooperation with 
Germany, marking the beginning of the Continuation War. 
At the beginning of the Continuation War the Soviet forces 
enjoyed only a two-to-one superiority over the Finns, and this 
permitted the Finns to advance fairly quickly to establish a 
defensive line in the area where the network of trenches was 
eventually to be located. The FAF had about 120 fighters in its 
flying units at that time, including Brewsters (BW), Fiats (FA), 
Morane-Saulniers (MS), Curtisses (CU) and some Hurricanes 
(HC), 21 bombers, mainly Blenheims (BL) plus some war booty 
planes, and 58 reconnaissance and liaison planes of various types, 
mainly obsolete.24 During this initial phase of the campaign the 
FAF achieved air superiority, and the Brewsters in particular 
excelled themselves, achieving a remarkable exchange ratio of 
32:1.,They added to the Winter War formation tactics and shooting 
accuracy a vertical energy-speed manoeuvre which was very 
effective against their main adversaries of that time, the I-153 
Chaikas and 1-16 Ratas, which were more agile but a little slower. 
During the trench war period the most important air 
operations were carried out in the Gulf of Finland. These were 
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partly the outcome of naval operations, and gradually the process 
evolved into the Battle of the Gulf of Finland, which culminated 
in Soviet air raids on Kotka and Helsinki. Finnish fighter pilots 
carried the main defensive burden in this battle, and were quite 
successful in this. The FAF strategy of concentrating on aerial 
combat instead of attacks on the well-defended enemy bases 
proved correct. The numbers of enemy aircraft destroyed on the 
ground didn't mean much because the superpower's own aircraft 
production plus lend-lease support from Great Britain and the 
United States meant that there was no shortage of aircraft. The 
shortage of trained pilots, however, became a problem for the 
Soviets, as became apparent in the final phase of the Battle of the 
Gulf of Finland. After the major aerial engagements of May 1944, 
the People's Commissar for the Navy, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, 
had to withdraw a whole regiment from front line duties because 
of the lack of pilots.22 
When the tide of war changed and the German forces 
began to retreat westwards, Soviet pressure on Finland increased. 
In spring of 1944 the Soviets decided to take Finland before 
beginning their advance towards Berlin. They amassed a ten-
fold superiority in troops and aircraft on the Karelian Isthmus 
and began their strategic offensive on 9th June 1944. They met 
with some success initially, forcing the withdrawal of Finnish 
forces along the Isthmus, but in July 1944 the Finns were able to 
stabilize the front at the Vuoksi River and further attempts by the 
Soviet forces to advance beyond this line were repelled. The 
process seen in the Winter War was repeated. 
Despite the Soviet superiority in numbers of aircraft, the 
FAF was able to concentrate its air forces and continue to achieve 
good results. The Brewsters, along with the Morane, Fiat and 
Curtiss fighters, although continuing their operations, became 
obsolete in terms of performance from 1943 on, and new fighters, 
Messerschmitt 109 G (MT)s, were received, although once again 
only in small numbers. When the Soviet offensive began, the 
units had about 40 Messersrhmitts.24 Fortunately, the FAF was 
able to get 74 more fighters from Germany during the campaign, 
so that despite the fierce battles, the number of Messerschmitt 
fighters actually increased during the summer of 1944. The 
number of bombers in the flying units at the beginning of June 
1944 was 66.24 
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One good example of the ability to achieve local and 
temporal air superiority was the fact that the FAF bombers and a 
German support unit known as Kuhlmey were able to continue 
their effective air raids, which were vital contributions to the war 
effort, as the bombings could be concentrated on massed troops 
just before their preplanned attack times. Warnings of impeding 
troop movements were usually captured by radio intelligence. It 
is also significant that no bombers in the formations escorted by 
the Messerschmitts were lost to enemy fighters during this period. 
The Messerschmitts thus achieved an exchange ratio of 25:1. 
The anti-aircraft artillery was in fairly good shape when 
the Continuation War began as compared with the situation 
during the Winter War. The army corps and divisions were 
almost fully equipped, although some units in the rear area 
organizations still lacked adequate artillery support. The total 
numbers of guns in the various units were 107 75-76 mm cannons, 
314 40 mm cannons, 189 20 mm cannons and 153 7.62-12.7 mm 
machine guns. The clear emphasis in the disposition of weaponry 
was on the front line troops.' 
In the attack phase leading to the trench war line the anti-
aircraft artillery units served well to protect the troops, and the 
only problems were the difficulties in building up a working air 
surveillance network during the rapid advance. Due to the lack 
of early warning possibilities, some special light anti-aircraft 
units were established, and these, being able to move with the 
infantry, could also protect the spearhead units. During the trench 
war it was the anti-aircraft artillery in Kotka and Helsinki that 
was under the heaviest pressure, and a system employing a 
control centre with target acquisition and a controlled barrage 
firing technique was developed in both cities. Especially in the 
big Helsinki raids carried out by the Soviets in February 1944, the 
anti-aircraft artillery excelled in turning the main bulk of the 
bombers away with coordinated barrages backed up by special 
light effects and misleading ground bonfire patterns. The anti-
aircraft artillery units on the Isthmus were under very heavy 
pressure in the final combats during the summer of 1944 and 
fared extremely well. In addition to the losses caused to the 
attacker, they attracted a high proportion of the enemy sorties to 
themselves, lightening the burden on the other troops. Even 
more anti-aircraft units could and should have been concentrated 
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in the Isthmus region, for as it was, only one quarter of the field 
army anti-aircraft resources were located there.8 
Norway 
When Germany attacked Norway on 9th April 1940, the 
Norwegians began their resistance and the first air combat took 
place. The main part of the Junkers Ju 52 transport formation 
carrying the paratroopers with the mission of occupying the 
Fornebu air base near Oslo had to turn back due to the fog on the 
route, but the covering formation of eight Messerschmitt 110 
long-range fighters was on the spot and was attacked by nine 
Norwegian Gloster Gladiators. Two of the Messerschmitts were 
shot down, but the remaining six continued to strafe the defences 
of the base and finally landed there due to a shortage of fuel. 
Two of the Gladiators, which had landed earlier, had been set on 
fire and the rest were given orders not to land at Fornebu. They 
landed on frozen lakes north and west of Oslo. The Messerschmitt 
110 crews were then able to secure the base for the Junkers Ju 52 
transports, which eventually began to arrive.20 
During the day the Stavanger-Sola air base also was 
occupied by the Germans and under the pressure of numerous 
bombardments most of the Norwegian strongpoints had yielded 
to the German airborne troops by the evening of April 9th.20 The 
organized air defence eventually lost its infrastructure, and during 
the next few weeks, when the allied expeditionary force had 
failed in its attempt at invasion, the occupation spread to cover 
the entire country. 
All the aircraft that had a sufficient range were flown to 
Britain, and the task of establishing a new Norwegian defence 
organization was started there while fighting was still going on 
in Norway. One of the results was the opening of the "Little 
Norway" camp in Canada in December 1940. This was a joint 
Army-Navy flight training establishment.13 
330 Squadron was established in Iceland in May and June 
of 1941, with Northrop seaplanes which had been ordered before 
the war. Then followed 331 Squadron, operating Hurricanes from 
Catterick and later Spitfires from Skeabre on Orkney. Next was 
332 Squadron at Catterick, also with Spitfires, and 333 Squadron, 
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first with three Catalina flying-boats at Woodhaven and later 
with a flight of six Mosquito fighter-bombers at Leuchars. The 
Mosquito flight later became 334 Squadron.13 
At the turn of 1942, No. 132 Norwegian Fighter Wing was 
established at North Weald outside London. This consisted of 
331 and 332 Squadrons, with Spitfires. 
By Royal Decree of 28th March 1941 it was determined that 
the two air forces should be placed under a joint Norwegian 
command but otherwise retain their independence. The new 
command was set up in London and called the Joint Air Force 
Command. This new organization was ordered by the Ministry 
of Defence in 1943 to consider a full amalgamation of the Navy 
and Army Air Forces, a measure that was completed in summer 
1944, and on 10th November of that same year the Royal 
Norwegian Air Force was established as an independent service 
by Royal Decree. All materials and staff from the two former 
Flying Corps were taken over, and the work of creating a new 
service began.13. 132 Fighter Wing was transferred to France in 
1944, and it also flew missions from bases in Holland and Belgium. 
It later returned to Scotland, and in May 1945 was repatriated to 
Norway to start the rebuilding process.12 
The Soviet Union 
The Red Air Force concentrated about 3000 aircraft against Finland 
when it began the Winter War on 30th November 1939. The main 
thrust was directed at the Karelian Isthmus, with over 1000 
planes of the 7th Army Air Force, and also north of Lake Ladoga, 
on the Isthmus of Olonets, where the 8th Army Air Force was 
operating with about 500 aircraft. There were also weaker 
formations operating further north, where the 9th and 14th Army 
Air Forces each had a couple of hundred planes. The Baltic Navy 
had about 470 aircraft on the eastern and southern coasts of the 
Gulf, of Finland. In addition, the offensive was supported by 300 
planes of the long-range bomber command' and 300 from 
Kravtshenko's Detachment.9 
The main aircraft types used by the Soviet forces were 
Polikarpov I-15 Bis, I-153 Chaika, and 1-16 Rata fighters, Tupolev 
SB-2 and Iljushin DB-3 bombers, Polikarpov R-5 and U-2 
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reconnaissance planes and a Beriev MBR-2 maritime 
reconnaissance plane. 
The Soviets started their air operations with bombing raids 
on sixteen cities or towns. These came as a surprise to the civilian 
population, and almost 100 people were killed and over 200 
wounded in Helsinki alone. Otherwise the air raids failed to 
achieve any military effect.' 
Weather conditions in early December were mainly poor, 
and this considerably restricted the air operations. Whenever the 
weather permitted, the bombing campaign was continued. Since 
the Finns had to concentrate their small fighter force and anti-
aircraft artillery units on the most critical areas of defence, the 
numerous Soviet bomber formations were often able to fly fairly 
freely over the hinterland of Finland. Thus they tended to fly 
without any fighter cover in the initial phase of the war. They 
occasionally suffered rather heavy losses when they did meet 
defending fighters, however, and often dropped their bomb loads 
prematurely at random and turned back attacked.21 The Soviet 
Command then changed its tactics and brought in large fighter 
formations as cover for them. 
A largish part of the force was withdrawn from the bombing 
campaign in the February to provide direct support for the ground 
force attack on the Karelian Isthmus, but the air raids still 
continued, and Vyborg experienced exceptionally heavy bombing, 
for example.19 At the beginning of March, just before the peace 
treaty was signed on 13th March, the Soviet fighters carried out a 
mission to intercept the Finnish fighters which were concentrating 
on ground attack sorties outside Vyborg. 
The air operations undertaken in the Winter War were 
considered a failure in the Soviet Union. Despite the over-
whelming, thirty-fold superiority in numbers, the bombing 
campaign, with about 44,000 sorties, failed to neutralize the 
Finnish war effort or to disrupt the country's economy. The 
morale of the Finnish people actually improved. It is thus 
understandable that the concept of strategic bombing won few 
advocates in the Soviet military councils of that period.14 Also, 
the Soviet fighter tactics proved to be mistaken. A tight triple 
formation was developed to increase firepower, on the 
assumption that the wingmen would follow the leader closely 
and shoot together with him each time. In practise, such tactics 
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possessed almost all the drawbacks of fighter aviation. The tight 
formation was easier for the enemy to see from a distance, the 
formation lookout doctrine was poor because the wingmen had 
to watch the movements of the leader carefully all the time, and 
only the leader had any practical chances of hitting a target in 
that kind of shooting arrangement. 
The main reason for the failure was obviously the 
complicated command system, which effectively ruined any 
attempts at concentrated use of the various forces. The supporting 
factor was the particularly subordinate status of the Air Force to 
the Red Army which gave no freedom to adjust the training and 
equipment to the specific demands of air combat. It is significant 
that although the Soviets had air superiority by virtue of sheer 
numbers, they were unable to weaken the Finnish fighter force 
or to prevent the FAF bomber and reconnaissance operations. 
The FAF fighter force's operational capacity was better at the end 
of the war than it had been at the beginning. It had been totally 
engaged all the time and had always been able to carry out its 
missions. 
When Germany opened her eastern attack on the Soviet 
Union on 22nd June 1941 this came as a surprise to the Soviet 
leadership. A variety of revealing intelligence information had 
been delivered to Stalin, but he had obviously planned to let 
Germany and the western powers tire themselves out in their 
war efforts before he made any move himself, and now it was 
hard for him to believe that Hitler had already made his eastern 
assault. 
The German "blixt" on the central front demanded almost 
all of the Soviet attention, but the Air Force still attacked various 
cities and air bases in Finland on 25th June 1941. Their unescorted 
bomber formations suffered very heavy losses, however, and 
the raids were not repeated. After these attacks Finland declared 
war, announcing military cooperation with Germany, whose 
troops already were operating in Lapland and in the Gulf of 
Finland. 
The Soviets had about five-fold superiority in numbers in the 
air on the northern front and about two-fold superiority on the 
ground, but they were on the defence and had to retreat to the 
waterline in Eastern Karelia, where the Finns voluntarily stopped 
their advance and secured their trench positions at the end of 1941. 
K1a 
The FAF enjoyed air superiority over the battle area at this 
stage, and the Soviet Air Force, caught by a surprise attack in the 
middle of its renewal and reorganization programme after the 
experiences of the Winter War, was unable to provide any effective 
opposition to its air operations in support of the advance of the 
ground forces. During the trench warfare period at the beginning 
of 1942 the Soviets gradually improved their air assets and 
introduced their first new aircraft types, e.g. the MiG-1 and MiG-
3 fighters. Western lend-lease support in the form of British 
Hurricane and Spitfire fighters and American Tomahawks and 
Airacobras began to arrive in more and more substantial 
quantities.24 
When the German advance was stalled and the retreat 
westwards began, Soviet pressure on the northern front also 
started to grow. The main area of operation was the surroundings 
of Leningrad and the Gulf of Finland, while the main target 
inside Finland in 1943 was the city of Kotka, an important harbour 
for naval operations in the Gulf of Finland. The new dive bomber, 
the Petlyakov Pe-2, and the LaGG-3 and La-5 fighters, and later 
the Yak-9, together with the lend-lease aircraft, formed the 
backbone of the air fleet, which operated from bases around 
Leningrad, the island bases of Lavansaari, Seiskari and Kronstadt, 
and the Borki air base in the Oranienbaum encirclement. 
The Pe-2 dive bomber formations, escorted by fighters, 
made regular attacks on Kotka, and in addition to strengthening 
their anti-aircraft artillery system, the Finns had to establish a 
new fighter air base in Kymi and deploy their new 34th Fighter 
Squadron, equipped with Messerschmitt 109 G 2 fighters, there 
to defend Kotka. There were frequent fierce air battles over the 
Gulf of Finland as the Soviet formations carried out their raids 
and the FAF fighters attacked them from the Kymi and Suulajärvi 
air bases. The Soviet Air Force could easily replace the planes 
lost in these air battles, but the losses of pilots began to become a 
concern to them.22 By the beginning of 1944 the first contacts 
were being made about a separate peace agreement between the 
Soviets and the Finns. The Soviet terms were considered 
unacceptable in Finland, however, and so, the Soviets tried to 
make them see reason by sending formations from the Long 
Range Bomber Command (Aviatsiya Dalnego Destviya - ADD) 
to the air bases of Levashovo, Kasimovo and Gorskaya near 
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Leningrad, in close proximity to the front line. These and other 
formations in the rear, altogether about 500 bombers, started a 
strategic bombing campaign and carried out three major night 
air raids on Helsinki in February 1944. The well coordinated 
barrage fire of the Helsinki anti-aircraft defence was able to 
repulse and deceive the main thrust of the raids, however, and 
the damage remained minor relative to the volume of the attacks. 
Out of a total of about 20,000 bombs dropped during the raids, 
only about 800 hit the city. Casualties amounted to 146 people 
killed and 356 wounded.23 
At the beginning of March 1944 three Finnish bomber 
squadrons were on the alert, while air surveillance and radio 
intelligence were watching the movements of the ADD 
formations. When these were returning from Tallinn after an air 
raid on 9th March, Finnish bomber squadrons joined them over 
the Gulf of Finland under cover of night and followed them to 
their bases. When the landing lights were on and the Soviet 
bombers were in the middle of their landing sequence, the Finnish 
bombers started their run and dropped their bomb loads on the 
bases. After this the ADD formations were transferred to rear 
bases and the Helsinki raids were not repeated.24 
A build-up of troops to take Finland was initiated in spring 
1944, before the race to Berlin began, and the decisive offensive 
was planned for 9th June 1944. The troops due to participate in 
this operation had been in training in the area south-west of 
Leningrad. It was calculated that a ten-fold superiority in numbers 
was needed for the campaign. The air component included the 
13th Army Air Force, the II Fighter Corps and the Baltic Navy 
Air Force. The 13th Army Air Force was reinforced by two bomber 
divisions (where one division contained three regiments, each 
having 32 bombers) and one ground attack division from the 
Long-Range Bomber Command. The total number of combat 
planes was about 1500. 
The mission of the 13th Army Air Force was:24 
- to destroy Finnish defence positions in the 21st Army's 
attack sector 
- to prevent enemy artillery and mortar barrage fire 
- to prevent the transfer of the Finnish troops to their prepared 
defence positions 
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- to destroy the Vyborg railway yard, the Raivola and Rautu 
railway stations and the bridges over the Vuoksi River at 
Kiviniemi 
- to prevent road and railway transportations up to the line 
Vyborg - Käkisalmi 
- to provide cover for troops of the 21st and 23rd Armies, 
reserves, lines of communication and positions against 
enemy air attacks. 
Air reconnaissance was to be extended to 150 kilometres beyond 
enemy lines, to the line Hiitola-Lappeenranta-Hamina. 
The Baltic Navy Air Force flew several reconnaissance 
missions, a sea transport cover mission and a special mission to 
carry out an attack with two I1-2 ground regiments on defence 
positions at Valkeasaari. 
After the initial success of the offensive the Finns were able 
to stop the Soviet advance at the Vuoksi River in July. The 
superiority in numbers proved to be inadequate and the race to 
Berlin was accelerating all the time. The Soviet Union started to 
remove its troops from the Karelian front to the Central European 
area. A cease-fire was agreed on with Finland on 4th September 
1944, which meant that the summer 1944 offensive against Finland 
became the only one which the Soviet Union failed to carry 
through during the latter part of the war. 
The situation in terms of numbers was very much the same 
at the end of the Continuation War as it had been in the Winter 
War. The Soviet Union had clear numerical superiority in the air 
and carried out massive bombings and continuous close support 
operations with its effective 11-2 ground attack planes. It also had 
a very dense, effective anti-aircraft artillery in its ground troops 
and its air bases were well protected with anti-aircraft weapons, 
but as in the Winter War, they were unable to weaken the FAF 
fighter force, so that the capacity of the FAF fighter force actually 
increased during the hectic air battles of summer 1944, mostly 
because of minimal pilot losses combined with the delivery of 
new fighters from Germany. Almost all the Finnish top aces 
were fighting at the end of the war just as they had been at the 
beginning. Thus they were able to achieve local and temporal air 
superiority, while the bomber and reconnaissance units were 
similarly able to carry on their missions throughout. 
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Sweden 
When Germany attacked Poland in September 1939, the Swedish 
Flygvapnet increased its state of readiness, and after a few weeks 
this was adjusted to permit an accelerated effort to improve air 
combat capacity.15 
A new warning of changes in the security policy 
environment came when the Soviet Union attacked Finland on 
30th November of the same year. Sweden as a nation took a 
strictly neutral position, but voluntary help was given to Finland 
at an individual level. A voluntary flying unit, F 19, was 
established at the end of 1939 and started to operate from 
temporary air bases at Veitsiluoto, Olkkavaara, Märkäjärvi, Oulu, 
Vaala and Posio at the beginning of 1940 with 12 Gloster 
Gladiators and 4 Hawker Harts. Although the unit was small, it 
represented a major part of the Swedish fighter force of that time, 
and the support it provided was very important to Finland 
because it made possible to concentrate the entire Finnish fighter 
force on repelling the main Soviet attack.25 
Some voluntary anti-aircraft artillery units also supported 
Finland in the Winter War. There was one anti-aircraft company 
and one anti-aircraft artillery battery operating in Lapland and 
one anti-aircraft artillery battalion and a naval anti-aircraft 
detachment in Turku.8 
The next major military operation to occur nearby was the 
occupation of Denmark and Norway by the Germans in April 
1940, which meant that Sweden was now surrounded by conflict 
areas. Even though the country's advantageous position behind 
the "frontline" states had kept it away from the action, the 
nearness of the danger was not comforting. 
The examples of Finland in the Winter War and Great 
Britain in the Battle of Britain left their mark on the Swedish 
development plan. Two more fighter wings, F9 at Säve and F10 
at Bulltofta at first and then at Angelholm, were added to the 
programme. Also, a long-range reconnaissance wing was to be 
established at Nyköping under a decision taken in 1940, and the 
next year a decision was made for a bomber wing, F12, at Kalmar 
and a base organization, F21, at Luleå. 
The five-year programme approved in 1941 laid down 
that:16 
- further flying groups (flygeskadrar) should be established 
- the entire country should be divided into air base areas 
- the force of fighters and torpedo planes should be 
strengthened 
- new wings should be established 
- the number of reserve aircraft should be increased markedly 
- a workshop organization should be built up 
- the aircraft industry should receive increased support. 
The development plan was continued during the next few years, 
and by the time World War II ended Sweden had built almost a 
ten-fold air force compared with that of 1936. The 46 divisions 
comprised about 550 combat aircraft, of which the majority were 
Swedish-built, and the total number of planes was over 800. 
There were 15 fighter divisions, 15 bomber divisions, 2 torpedo 
divisions, 3 long-range reconnaissance divisions, 5 army 
reconnaissance divisions and 6 maritime reconnaissance 
divisions.16 
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AIR POWER AFTER WORLD WAR II 
Finland 
The most important combat lesson to emerge from the war for 
FAF was that quality is all-important, and that the most important 
quality factor is personnel. The world record number of ace 
fighter pilots relative to population1° proved to be such an asset 
that the FAF could always fight successfully regardless of enemy 
numbers. The national investment in the fighter force had been 
too small, but anywhere where this team was it remained 
unbeaten. Supported by technicians with a readiness for the 
necessary technical improvisation, this force caused heavy losses 
to the enemy and, perhaps even more important, suffered so few 
losses itself that it was able to maintain its combat readiness 
through the two wars. Although the number one quality factor 
was human resources, the level of technology must also be at 
least at the same category as that of the adversary. This became 
evident in the use of obsolete reconnaissance aircraft, for while 
the pilots in this branch carried out perhaps the most brilliant 
feats of airmanship of all, they were compelled to take advantage 
of the weather and night conditions in a very carefully preplanned 
manner. 
The bombers played a very decisive role in the battles of 
summer 1944, and were also used successfully for long-range 
photoreconnaissance and mapping, but the maintaining of a 
large enough attack force proved to be beyond the limits of a 
small nation. 
After the war a reorganization to a peace-time level of 
deployment took place throughout the defence forces. The FAF 
changed its wing organization for an air command organization 
with regional air defence responsibilities. The fierce fighting of 
summer 1944, which had demanded all the resources that the 
force could muster, had taught the FAF the right principle of 
organization. Centralized control allows the commander to use 
the force flexibly on a national scale, while a decentralized 
operational system gives each commander the ability to defend 
his respective airspace with the fighter wing, air surveillance 
network, control centres and a system of air bases. A force that is 
evenly distributed in peace-time can quickly be redeployed, so 
that one air command can at a certain phase have the entire 
fighter force in its disposal, for example. 
The new air surveillance and control system was built up 
around control centres equipped with British Marconi long-range 
radar systems and a network of Finnish-made middle-range 
VRRVI and VRRVY radar devices. The wartime equipment 
continued to dominate the arsenal of the fighters up to the 1950s, 
when the transfer to the jet age was made with the help of 
Vampire fighters. After this such planes as the Gnat, Fouga 
Magister, MiG-21 F and Bis, Draken and Hawk have preserved 
the line up to the present fighter system. The total number of 
aircraft has traditionally been small, but there are two key factors 
which have boosted the effectiveness of the force. Firstly, the 
entire force is concentrated on the most important task: air 
superiority, with both training and equipment devoted to air 
combat. Secondly, the professionalism inherited from the war 
has proceeded without interruption breaks through all the 
technical generations, building up a continuity of readiness to 
adopt new applications of aviation technology. 
One of the biggest changes in air defence after the war was 
implemented in 1952, when the anti-aircraft artillery was 
subordinated to the Army. The leadership of the AAA opposed 
the transfer, suspecting that the air defence system would suffer ,8  
but the transfer was made for reasons rationalization in the years 
of stringent economy that accompanied the rebuilding after the 
war. One reason was, of course, that the majority of the anti-
aircraft artillery units had been deployed to protect army troops 
in the field in the final phase of the war. 
Although the transfer decision was a step backwards as far 
as systems development was concerned, the AAA and Air Force 
actually turned it into a step forward. Both of these major 
components of the air defence system were highly specialized 
and their weapon systems and personnel training used different 
technological applications and methods. The AAA was 
predominantly a reserve training organization, like the Army, 
with wartime complement achieved by mobilization, whereas 
the Air Force was a professional branch with its fighting capacity 
maintained continuously even in peace-time. The major factor 
that they had in common was the air surveillance system and the 
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air defence fire control system. By combining this area of action, 
each could achieve the best possible effectiveness by specializing 
in its own mission and coordinating the net result. 
The Commander of Air Force is responsible for the total air 
defence fire control of the country, and accordingly, the Air 
Force is responsible for the air surveillance system. Conversely, 
all air defence units except for the anti-aircraft units earmarked 
for the Air Force and Navy belong to the Army. These are 
connected to the Air Force surveillance system and are able to 
receive the overall air surveillance picture. The Army has full 
tactical freedom to place its air defence units according to its own 
plans and situations, and at the same time their air defence fire is 
controlled by the Air Force control centres in full coordination 
with fighter ground control. In this way fighter interception and 
surface-to-air missiles, for instance, can be used effectively and 
in a coordinated manner in the same airspace. Thus, despite 
early misgivings, the basic arrangement has worked well by 
virtue of the key factors of high specialization and keen 
cooperation. 
The material development of the country's anti-aircraft 
defence has advanced through steps which are very much 
universal in nature. The dominance of radar for fire control 
purposes, special armoured anti-aircraft vehicles, automatic 
cannons, fire control wagons and replacement of the heaviest 
calibers with cannons which have higher fire rates and smaller 
calibers are typical examples. The surface-to-air missile era was 
ushered in with the British Bloodhound system, followed by the 
Russian SA-3 and the French Crotale and Mistral systems. The 
small Russian shoulder-launched IR missile weapons Strela and 
Igla were also introduced into Army units.18 
Norway 
The post-war RNAF consisted of seven squadrons, of which 
three were fighter squadrons, two light bomber squadrons and 
two reconnaissance squadrons. It received its four first jets, De 
Havilland Vampire F 3s, in the spring of 1948, and eventually 
acquired 62 of these altogether. The aircraft had a short service 
life, however, and the last of the country's original jets was 
grounded for good in 1956.13 
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Norway became a founder member of NATO when it was 
established in 1949, and as a representative of the organization's 
northern flank, the country was to possess eight fighter squadrons 
of 25 planes each.12 The American military aid and assistance 
programme contributed in all to the procurement of 206 
Thunderjet F-84 E/G fighter aircraft.13 
During the 1950s one type of aircraft after another made its 
appearance at short intervals. Pilots became familiar with the jet 
trainers T-33 or T-bird, the Sabre F-85 F was introduced in 1955, 
and later a new version, the F-86 K. After a little less than a 
decade with Thunderjets and Sabres, F-104 Starfighter aircraft 
were purchased in the early 1960s, representing the high 
technology of the era. After a couple of years yet another new 
fighter, the F-5 Freedom Fighter, was added to the RNAF 
inventory.13 
In June 1975 Belgium, Denmark, Holland and Norway 
concluded an agreement to purchase and assemble a new fighter, 
the F-16 A/B. The RNAF received its first F-16 in January 1980 
and the last of the total batch of 72 aircraft was delivered in June 
1984. One special item of equipment supplied for the Norwegian 
F-16 fighters was a drag chute to combat the occasionally slippery 
runways in Norway." 
The F-16 fighters are deployed in four squadrons at two air 
bases, Rygge and Bodö. Together with the F-5 Freedom fighters, 
of which 15 have been selected to be modernized continue in 
service up to 2000, the F-16s form the backbone of the Norwegian 
fighter defence. This can be strengthened by NATO additions if 
the situation so demands. The F-16s are being subjected to a Mid-
Life Update (MLU) during this decade, with the aim of making 
this originally clear weather fighter capable of all weather 
interception.12 
In addition to their air defence task, the F-16s also are 
earmarked for use on the anti-shipping missions, armed with 
Norwegian Penguin Mk.3 anti-ship missiles. 
The long coastline of Norway emphasizes the importance 
of maritime surveillance and the wartime operations Catalina 
and Sunderland have been succeeded by maritime patrols carried 
out by 7 Lockheed P-3B Orion aircraft. These operate from Andoya 
and cooperate with other NATO surveillance aircraft over the 
northern sea areas. 
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The anti-aircraft troops in Norway are organized under the 
Inspector of Air Defence. They received their first weapons from 
the arsenal which the Germans left behind, after which they 
acquired five British AMES 21 stations in 1946, including 
surveillance radar, height measuring radar, a control wagon and 
power supply. Three categories of control centre, Control and 
Reporting Centre, Control and Reporting Post and Reporting 
Post, were established in the late 1940s. The purchasing of long-
range radar was initiated in 1953, when four British NT-960 
stations were acquired. In the same year American aid brought 
TPS-1D surveillance radar devices and TPS-10D height measuring 
radars,1' and in the mid-1950s American support provided FPS-8 
surveillance radar systems, which were modified in 1964 to the 
FPS-88 standard. FPS-6 height measuring radars were also 
supplied. 
A new era began in 1961, when Norway's radar network 
was integrated into the NATO Early Warning System. After that 
developments took place at the same rate as in other NATO 
countries. The NADGE system, reaching from Nordkap to Turkey, 
was completed in 1972, and new SINDRE radar stations were 
built in the 1980s.18 
Norway received its first new guns in 1950, again as 
American aid. These 90 mm M1A2 models with modern central 
computers replaced the old heavy guns. Other material was also 
purchased at that time, so that by 1953 the RNAF had 45 heavy 
and 40 light anti-aircraft artillery batteries, in addition to the 21 
batteries operated by Home Defence. The light batteries were 
equipped with Swedish Bofors 40 mm guns, but new 40 mm L/ 
70 guns were purchased in 1958 to replace the older weapons. A 
central radar computer system, RSS-40 SkyGuard, was acquired 
in the 1980s for fire control in connection with these guns.18 
The short-range anti-aircraft weaponry was renewed in the 
1960s with the purchase of four 12.7 mm barrel machine guns 
and two 20 mm barrel FK20-2 cannons. Commissioning of the 
Nike missile batteries, purchase of which had been decided on in 
1957, began in 1959, and operative readiness was reached in 
1960. The missiles used were of two kinds at first, Ajax and 
Hercules, but from 1969 on only one type, the Nike Hercules, 
was used. The system was modified in 1971 to conform to the 
Nike Improved level, which meant better accuracy, thrust and 
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electronic jamming resistance. A new modification project to 
improve the interception of fast, low flying targets, known as the 
SAMCAP level, was accomplished in 1975. The last modification 
was carried out in 1983 by installing new microprocessors in the 
system according to the NATO Nike Support Plan. 
In the early 1980s Norway was studying alternative middle-
range anti-aircraft missile systems. The candidates were Roland I 
and II, Rapier and Hawk. When the USA rejected the Roland II 
system, Norway had to recommence its evaluation. The eventual 
choice was the Hawk, which had been developed to the level of 
the Improved Hawk. This was further modified to NOAH, or 
Norwegian Adapted Hawk. From the late 1980s onwards Norway 
has been buying more Swedish RB-70 missiles, which were 
already in use in the 1970s, to replace its L-40 artillery guns.18 
The Soviet Union/Russia 
The strategic situation around the Soviet Union had altered 
radically as a result of World War II. The occupied countries in 
eastern Central Europe offered a wide deployment area, and 
among the reduced number of superpowers the Soviet Union 
ranked second only to the United States. 
Strenuous efforts had to be directed to providing the Soviet 
military establishment with means of waging an intercontinental 
nuclear war in the rapidly approaching jet and missile age and of 
defending the Soviet homeland against modern long-range 
offensive weapon systems. Tactical air power was no longer 
sufficient: the age of strategic air power had dawned.14 
Soviet planners considered the position of the Soviet Union 
vis-à-vis the United States in terms of air power at the end of 
World War II far from satisfactory, in spite of the progress made 
in the aviation industry and air force during the preceding 
decades. Soviet Union was behind the West in many fields that 
would determine the comparative strength and capabilities of 
the Soviet Air Force in the immediate post-war world. Future 
prospects were nevertheless promising. 
The first project launched by Soviet air-power planners 
after World War II was to establish a modern air defence system 
to protect the homeland against possible air attack by the United 
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States. This priority was dictated by the fact that the United 
States alone already had both an intercontinental bomber force 
and an atomic bomb. Concurrently, there was an increasingly 
important requirement to furnish the Soviet armed forces with 
their own long-range, intercontinental bombers that could deliver 
nuclear weapons effectively at great distances. The development 
of nuclear weapons had already become a programme of the 
highest priority in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, great 
importance was attached to guided missiles, particularly surface-
to-surface ballistic missiles. The Russians looked on the German 
rocket advances at first as providing new and more effective 
means of executing the role of artillery forces, but in time they 
came to regard them as the backbone of an intercontinental 
warfare system.14 
In accordance with high-level decisions reached in 1946, 
about the same time as the initiation of the first post-war Five 
Year Plan, the State Committee for Defence was abolished and its 
affairs were transferred to the Council of People's Commissars, 
and People's Commissariat (now Ministry) for the Armed Forces 
was established. As a result, all military air power was placed 
under the direction of a single administrative authority. This 
centralization at the ministerial level continued until 1950, when 
separate war and navy ministries were again set up. The latter 
step was taken at a time when the jet equipment programmes 
were well under way and the build-up of naval capabilities was 
being given higher priority. It lasted only three years, however. 
Under the new Ministry of the Armed Forces, the Air Force 
was elevated to the same level as the Navy and the Army Ground 
Forces, thus becoming one of the three basic branches. The 
autonomous status of Soviet Long Range Aviation within the 
Soviet Air Force was restored, and a new leadership was provided 
for the Air Force and for the aviation industry. 
The manpower of the Soviet Air Force was markedly 
reduced at first after World War II, under a partial demobilization 
order, and the number of combat planes decreased to about 
14,000 or 15,000. These changes were accompanied by a 
considerable regrouping and consolidating of forces, which 
nevertheless still remained very numerous as compared with 
those of the United States Air Force after demobilization. 14 
By 1948 an increase in strength was again apparent, 
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probably mainly because the new jet fighters and long-range 
conventional bombers were becoming available and the light jet 
bomber replacements for the Tu-2 and Pe-2 in the tactical air 
fleets were expected to arrive by 1951. The complement of the 
force also increased during the period 1948-50, in response to the 
requirements of Soviet foreign policy, which was becoming more 
and more evident to the West. The country's aircraft strength 
was about 18,000 to 19,000 planes in from fifteen to eighteen 
armies. These included about 1,000 jet fighters.14 
Within the first two years after the war the Russians were 
producing two interim jet fighters based on two captured German 
turbojet engines, the Junkers JUMO-004 and BMW-003. Both of 
these engines were leaving the Soviet factories in 1946. The first 
jet fighter was the MiG-9, which used two BMW-003s, now known 
as RD-20. This was an original design that had been started by 
the team of Mikoyan and Gurevich even before the end of the 
war. Next came the Yak-15, which was an adaptation of the basic 
airframe of the Yak-9 powered by a single JUMO-004B turbojet 
engine called the RD-10. This fighter project had also begun 
before the end of the war. It was later modified as the Yak-17, 
Yak-19 and Yak-23. 
As a result of the successful testing of the MiG-15 late in 
1947, the initial work of other designers in the jet fighter field 
was passed over. This was the fate of the Sukhoi Su-9, which 
resembled the Messerschmitt Me-262A, and the Lavochkin La-
160, reportedly the first Soviet jet fighter embodying wing sweep-
back. The Russians were more concerned at first with building 
up a nucleus of trained jet fighter pilots and establishing a ground 
organization, a base structure and early warning radar networks 
to support a sizeable jet force than with attempts to develop a 
variety of jet fighter models with marginally better performance 
than their Western counterparts. 14 
Thanks to the importation from the United Kingdom of 25 
Rolls-Royce Nene I centrifugal-flow turbojet engines and thirty 
of the low-powered Derwent Vs in 1947 and 1948, the Soviet 
Union was able to take a tremendous step forward in its engine 
industry. These engines were considerably better than the 4,400 
lbs engine based on a German design which had originally been 
selected to power the MiG-15. Both of the British engines were 
copied, improved and put into mass production in the Soviet 
Union within a remarkably short time. The MiG fighters were 
developed through types MiG-17, MiG-19 and MiG-21 in the 
course of the 1950s and 1960s, and a very similar family of 
Sukhoi fighters was also produced. 
In the bomber field, the first major work was carried out by 
the Tupolev organization in copying the United States B-29 four-
engine conventional medium bomber within a space of only two 
years. This aircraft, called Tu-4, was in mass production by 1948, 
and the first individuals had been delivered to Long Range 
Aviation units to become the carriers of the Soviet Union's first 
atomic bombs. The Russians recognized the necessity of 
developing a turbojet bomber to supersede the Tu-4, however, 
and in 1948 Ilyushin came up with a four-engined prototype, the 
I1-16, but this was under-powered, as it depended on the JUMO-
004 for its power. Limited production of a later tactical jet bomber 
designed by Tupolev for the Soviet Navy, the two-engine Tu-14, 
began in 1952. By then Ilyushin's two-engine light jet bomber, 
the I1-28, was being produced in quantity as a successor to their 
prototype I1-26, and from then on Tupolev concentrated more on 
longer range bombers and transport aircraft. 
The introduction of the MiG-23, Su-24 and Su-17 series of 
tactical aircraft, replacing the previous generation which had 
dominated Soviet deployments in the 1960s, improved the range/ 
payload characteristics of major Soviet tactical aircraft in the 
1970s and meant that air strikes against mobile targets could be 
accomplished throughout the depth of the theatre. At the same 
time, the development of mobile surface-to-air missiles and high 
performance radar-guided AAA which were organic to the Soviet 
defence had the effect of reducing the demands placed upon 
Frontal Aviation for the air defence of Soviet divisions when 
manoeuvring, at rest, or in second echelon holding areas.14 
Bombers such as the Tu-95 Bear, Tu-22 Blinder and Tu-
22M Backfire are examples of the offensive equipment of 1960s 
and 1970s. A major reorganization of Soviet Air and Air Defence 
Forces took place between 1978 and 1980, including Frontal 
Aviation, Long-Range Aviation, interceptor aircraft of the 
National Air Defence (IA-PVO) and Ground Force Troops of the 
Anti-Aircraft Defence (PVO Voysk). Prior to the reorganization, 
Frontal Aviation was organized into sixteen tactical armies, each 
subordinate to the local commander of a military district in the 
Soviet Union or the commander of the Group of Soviet Forces 
deployed outside the Soviet Union. These numbered armies were 
disbanded and the majority of their assets became Air Forces 
subordinated directly to the Military Districts and Groups of 
Soviet Forces or Fronts in wartime. Some of these assets, together 
with bombers of Long-Range Aviation, also went to make up 
what is known as the Air Armies of the Supreme High Command. 
The overall purpose of the reorganization was to create a strategic 
and operational structure to provide integrated air support in 
the Theatre of Military Operations (TVD).zb 
Each Air Force of a Military District or Group of Soviet 
Forces included tactical bombers, fighter-bombers, fighters, 
reconnaissance planes and army planes. The Theatres of Military 
Operations were designated as North-Western, Western, South-
Western, Near Eastern and Far Eastern. In addition to these there 
was the National Reserve. The Military District in the north was 
that of Leningrad.27 
An Air Force subordinated to a front in wartime could be 
as large as 300 aircraft, as had been the case with the old 16th Air 
Army assigned to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. One 
hundred and twenty-six aircraft were normally assigned to each 
fighter/ground attack division. Each regiment in turn was usually 
composed of three squadrons, depending upon type. Three flights 
were assigned per squadron. Air logistic functions were provided 
by the Aviation Technical Unit attached to each air force.26 
Not surprisingly, the bulk of Soviet air assets were deployed 
against NATO, including those assigned to the Group of Soviet 
Forces in Germany, the Group of Soviet Forces in Poland, and to 
the Carpathian, Baltic and Belorussian Military Districts in the 
USSR. As the NATO area represented the major diplomatic and 
military interest of the Soviet Union, it had deployed forces there 
to support that commitment. 
The total number of tactical combat aircraft in the various 
Theatres of Military Operations in the late 1980s was about 8,000, 
the total air assets of the various military organizations being 
deployed as follows:27 
Air Defence 
-1,210 interceptors: MiG-23 Flogger 420, MiG-25 Foxbat 305, 
Su-15 Flagon 240, Su-27 Flanker 5, Tu-28/-128 Fiddler 80, 
Yak-28 Firebar 65, MiG-31 Foxhound 95 
- 8 airborne warning and control aircraft: Tu-126 Moss 7, Il-
76 Mainstay 1 
Air Forces 
-165 long-range strategic bombers: Tu-95 Bear 150, Mya-4 
Bison 15, Tu-160 Blackjack in development 
- 550 medium-range bombers: Tu-22M Backfire 155, Tu-16 
Badger 260, Tu-22 Blinder 135 
- 2,780 tactical counter-air interceptors: MiG-21 Fishbed 490, 
MiG-23 Flogger 1,570, MiG-25 Foxbat 105, Su-15 Flagon 
260, Tu-128 Fiddler 20, Yak-28 Firebar 20, M1G-29 Fulcrum 
275, MiG-31 Foxhound 30, Su-37 Flanker 10 
- 2,835 ground attack aircraft: MiG-21 Fishbed 130, MiG-27 
Flogger 830, Su-7/-17 Fitter 895, Su-24 Fencer 770, Su-25 
Frogfoot 210 
- 50 tanker aircraft: Mya-4 Bison 30, Tu-16 Badger 20 
- 685 tactical reconnaissance and electronic countermeasures 
aircraft: MiG-21 Fishbed 65, MiG-25 Foxbat 195, Su-17 Fitter 
165, Su-24 Fencer 65, Yak-28 Brewer 195 
- 260 strategic reconnaissance and ECM aircraft: Tu-16 Badger 
115, Tu-22 Blinder 15, Tu-95 Bear 4, Yak-28 Brewer 102, 
MiG-25 Foxbat 24 
- 3,050 attack assault helicopters, including Mi-8 Hip and 
Mi-24 Hind 
-1,500 training aircraft, including 800 fixed-wing and 700 
rotary-wing aircraft 
- 575 military air transports assigned to Transport Aviation 
(VTA): An-22 Cock 55, An-12 Cup 210, I1-76 Candid 310 
-1,300 transports in other elements of the armed forces, 
1,635 civil aviation transports assigned to Aeroflot 
Naval Aviation 
- 340 strike and bomber aircraft: Tu-22M Backfire 120, Tu-16 
Badger 190, Tu-22 Blinder 30 
145 fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft: Su-17 Fitter 75, 
Yak-38 Forger 70 
- 70 tankers: Tu-16 Badger 
200 reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft, including 
Tu-16 Badgers, Tu-95 Bear Ds, Tu-22 Blinders, An-12 Cups, 
and others 
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- 480 anti-submarine aircraft: Tu-142 Bear F 60, Mi-14 Haxe 
A 100, Ka-27 Helix 60, Ka-25 Hormone A 115, Be-12 Mail 
95, I1-38 May 50 
- 465 transport and training aircraft 
Ground Forces 
- 4,260 combat and support helicopters: Mi-2 Hoplite 675, 
Mi-4 Hound 20, Mi-6 Hook 450, Mi-8 Hip 1,950, Mi-24 
Hind 1,100, Mi-26 Halo 50, Mi-10 Harke 15, Mi-28 Havoc 
and Ka-50 Hokum in development 
The Air Defence Air Force (PVO Strany) became an 
independent branch in the area of air defence and anti-aircraft 
systems in 1948. Its organization was:28 
Command System 
- Headquarters in Moscow 
- Air Defence Districts 
Radio Technical Troops 
Fighter Regiments 
Anti-Aircraft Troops 
The anti-aircraft units belonging to the army made up the Army 
Air Defence Troops (PVO-SV) and were not integrated into the 
national air defence system. The Army Air Defence Troops were 
subordinate to the Military Districts and Groups of Forces in 
peace-time and to the Front and Army Staffs in wartime. 
PVO Strany was reorganized in 1981 and its name was 
changed to Voyska PVO (Air Defence Troops), but it maintained 
its status as an independent branch, and the main body of army 
air defence troops, including the military schools, were annexed 
to it. The anti-aircraft aspect of the army was organized as a 
subordinate branch called the Air Defence of Troops (Voyskovaya 
PVO). Although the Soviet Army anti-aircraft troops seem to be 
subordinated to Voyska PVO, the dependence is probably more 
administrative, logistic and technical than operative. The Voyska 
PVO lost its separate command and control system in the 
reorganization, and about half of the fighters and the majority of 
the flying training system was transferred to the Air Force. 
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Voyska PVO consists of:28 
- Anti-Ballistic Missile Troops, Voyska PVO PRO 
- Space Defence Troops, Voyska PVO PKO 
- Air Defence Air Force, Aviatsia PVO 
- Air Defence of Troops, voyskovaya PVO 
- Air Defence Districts 
The first two of these report via Air Force Headquarters to 
the General Staff. Their equipment in the late 1980s consisted 
of:27 
- 9,000 strategic surface-to-air missile launchers: SA-1 2,300, 
SA-2 2,675, SA-3 1,135, SA-5 2,030, SA-10 860 
- 4,445 tactical SAM launchers: SA-4 1,350, SA-6 850, SA-8 
765, SA-9 500, SA-11 180, SA-13 800, SA-X-12 in 
development 
-100 anti-ballistic missile launchers ABM-1B Galosh 
- 7000 warning systems, including early warning and ground 
control intercept radars and satellites. 
The next major phase of change in the Russian air system occurred 
in the early 1990s, when the Soviet Union disintegrated and 
various limitations imposed by international agreements began 
to come into effect, at the same time as the country's faltering 
economy started to have its effect on the modernization plans. 
Sweden 
After the massive build-up during World War II, Flygvapnet 
started its modernization programme fairly soon, with the aim of 
moving into the jet age. Its first jet aircraft, a De Havilland 
Vampire J 28, was purchased in 1946, and the first Swedish-built 
jet plane, the SAAB J 29 Tunnan, was tested in autumn 1948 and 
later became a standard aircraft for fighter, attack and 
reconnaissance units in the 1950s.16 
In 1951 the service comprised 11 fighter wings with aircraft 
such as the J 30 Mosquito, J 22, J 26 Mustang, J 28A and B 
Vampire, J 21A-2 and R types, 4 attack wings with A 21, B 18B 
and T 18B, and two reconnaissance wings equipped with S 18A, 
S 31 Spitfire and J 26 Mustang." 
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A new jet attack plane, the A 32 Lansen, was introduced in 
1952, and three years later a jet fighter, the J 35 A Draken. The 
number of wings was the same in 1955 as in 1951, but the J 29 
Tunnan was already well represented in the units. Development 
of the air surveillance and control system was extended in the 
1950s via tests with PJ-21, PS-14 and PH-13 radar installations to 
reach the Stril-50 system, which has formed the basis for later 
modernizations. The base system, including the road bases also 
started to be extended in the 1950s.16 
Six fighter wings were equipped with J 29 Tunnan aircraft 
by 1960, two with J 32B Lansen, two with J 34 Hawker Hunter, 
120 of which had been purchased from Great Britain, and one 
with J 35A Draken. All four attack wings were equipped with the 
A 32 Lansen type. The two reconnaissance wings had S 29C 
Tunnans and S 32C Lansens." New long range radar systems, 
PS-08, had already been bought from Great Britain in the mid-
1950s, and the Stril-50 was modified to the Stril-60, with increased 
automatization, in the 1960s.29 
The first signs of a need to reduce the organization for 
reasons of economy appeared in the late 1960s. Thus F9 at Säve 
was closed down on 30 June 1969, and the same happened to F2, 
F3 and F8 in 1974. Next followed F11 and F12, while F14 together 
with F18 were reorganized as a non-combat unit.16 
A new aircraft type, the 37 Viggen, was introduced by 
SAAB on 8 February 1967 and eventually made its way into the 
units during the 1970s.17 A new combined light attack and trainer 
aircraft, the B3LA, was in the development plans in the 1970s but 
the project was later abandoned. 
By the 1980s the number of wings had dropped to a half of 
that of the early sixties. F21 in Luleå had JA 37 and S37 Viggens, 
F4 in Östersund JA37 Viggens, F13 in Linköping JA37 and S37 
Viggens, F16 in Uppsala JA37 Viggens and J35F Drakens, F10 in 
Angelholm J35F Drakens, F17 Ronneby JA37 Viggens, F6 in 
Karlsborg AJ37 Viggens, F7 in Såtenäs AJ37 Viggens and F15 in 
Söderhamn AJ37 and SK37 Viggens. There were about 220 
fighters, about 150 attack aircraft, including the light attack aircraft 
SK60, and about 50 reconnaissance planes.29 A decision to build a 
new aircraft, the Saab JAS 39 Gripen, was made in the early 
1980s, to be introduced in the early 1990s.36 
The question of the position of the anti-aircraft artillery in 
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the defence forces was taken up immediately after the war. There 
were four main objects of debate:3o 
- the position of anti-aircraft artillery as a type of arms in the 
army 
- transfer of the anti-aircraft artillery to the air force 
- transfer of air surveillance from the army to the air force 
- transfer of the coast artillery's anti-aircraft artillery to army 
units. 
In 1947 an air defence committee pointed to a number of 
weaknesses in air defence and suggested that fighter units, army 
anti-aircraft artillery and air surveillance should be united as an 
independent air defence branch. The Chief of Flygvapnet wanted 
to transfer the anti-aircraft artillery to the air force, and the Chief 
of the Army wanted it to stay in the army. The idea of a new 
branch was abandoned, as were changes in the basic 
organizational structure, but air surveillance was transferred from 
the army anti-aircraft artillery to the air force in 1948.30 
The peace-time organization of the anti-aircraft artillery in 
1949 comprised three regiments and four other anti-aircraft 
groups. Lv (Luftvärn) 2 in Linköping was closed down in 1958 
and Lv1 in Karlsborg the next year. The number of wartime units 
remained at about 300.30 
The anti-aircraft artillery in the late 1940s had 26 fire control 
radars, 158 central calculators of the Papello, Gamma and Haze 
type, and 172 searchlights. The new radar systems, PE-07/R and 
PS-23/R, had been bought from Great Britain, and the next steps 
were Stril-50 and Stril-60.18 
A new 40 mm gun with central calculator and radar was 
introduced in 1948, and a new 57 mm automatic cannon was 
taken into use in 1954. An anti-aircraft tank with two 40 mm 
guns and fire control radar was developed in 1960s. The missile 
era started in 1961 with the British Bloodhound II, called the Rb 
68. The American Hawk system, called the Rb 367 at first and 
later,  the Rb 67 was supplied in 1962. 
The Hawk system was modernized in 1977 and the name 
changed to Rb 77. The close range missile question was solved by 
purchasing Redeye shoulder missiles in 1969. 
Work was started in 1967 on a Swedish design, the Rbs 70, 
and the first test units were delivered in 1974. A target acquisition 
radar PS-70/R was part of the development of this system.18 
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THE CURRENT SITUATION AND 
FUTURE EXPECTATIONS 
Finland 
The current peace-time organization of the FAF is as follows 
(Figure 1): 
Headquarters, 	 Tikkakoski 
Lapland Air Command, 	Rovaniemi 
- 11 Fighter Wing 
Satakunta Air Command, Tampere 
- 21 Fighter Wing 
Karelia Air Command, 	Kuopio 
- 31 Fighter Wing 
All three Air Commands are identical in their organization, 
consisting of a headquarters, a control centre with radar and air 
surveillance network, an aircraft repair shop, a signal repair 
shop, a logistics centre and a staff company in addition to the 
fighter wing itself. The base system consists of main bases and 
alternative standby bases, including road bases. 
- Support Squadron Tikkakoski 
- Air Force Academy Kauhava 
- Air Force Signal School Tikkakoski 
- Air Force Technical School Halli 
- Aircraft Depot Tampere 
- Test Flight Centre Halli 
- Signal Depot Tikkakoski 
- Signal Test Centre Tikkakoski 
The peace-time complement is about 4500 persons, and the total 
number of aircraft is about 200, including 60 fighters and 54 BAe 
HAWK fighter trainers. The wartime strength is about 30 000 
persons. The majority of the reservists belong to the optical air 
surveillance and air base systems, both covering the entire 
country, or to the anti-aircraft units. The latest equipment 
modernization cycle has been concentrated on the air surveillance 
and control system and the fighter fleet. 
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A renewal of the long-range radar equipment has just been 
completed, in which the old Marconi system was replaced with 
the new French Thomson CSF 3-D long-range system. The 
Finnish-made middle-range radar devices of the late 1970s are 
now experiencing their first update modification cycle, and the 
first new gap-filler radar devices, Swedish Ericsson Giraffes, 
have been purchased. The air base approach radar systems, which 
are part of the air surveillance and control system, are now of the 
new British Plessey Watchman design." 
The modification cycle of the control centres is almost 
completed, so that these are now based on network-type data 
transfer, allowing a fighter to be intercepted in northern Finland 
under control from a centre in the south, for instance. 
The largest modernization project to come to the public eye 
has been the renewal of the fighter fleet of Draken and MiG-21 
Bis aircraft, which are reaching the end of their technical service 
life and are also becoming operationally obsolete in a rapidly 
developing international technological environment. 
This had been part of the FAF's long-range planning from 
the early 1980s, and the programme commenced officially in 
1989, when the first replacement candidates were named. A very 
comprehensive specification was drawn up and the first contacts 
were made with possible suppliers, Saab for the JAS 39 Gripen, 
Dassault for the Mirage 2000-5 and General Dynamics for their 
F-16. Since the bilateral trading agreement between Finland and 
the Soviet Union was still in force at that time, one further 
candidate, the MiG-29, was considered for purchase under that 
arrangement. 
During the evaluation period McDonnell Douglas and US 
Navy informed the Finnish authorities about a possible fifth 
candidate, the F/A-18 Hornet, which had originally been regarded 
as too expensive. This additional information placed it in the 
same category as the others in terms of total cost structure, and 
once the parliamentary defence policy committee had 
recommended that, for reasons of economy, the new fighters 
should all be of the same type and the entire purchase should be 
made as a one deal, the Hornet was included in the competition 
and a quotation was requested from the McDonnell Douglas 
Company. The evaluation was carried out in two phases: flight 
performance and controllability test flights on the manufacturer's 
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premises and radar and weapons system test flights in Finland in 
winter with identical FAF target patterns. Maintainability, 
availability and other cost calculations, together with negotiations 
over industrial participation, were carried out alongside the tests 
by the various specialized groups. The request was made for 
100% offset purchases, and every candidate supplier was ready 
to accede to this. 
The eventual decision was made in the late spring of 1992, 
and the final formula for determining the outcome, after a massive 
data processing operation, was quite a simple one: 
PERFORMANCE/TOTAL COST (including 
both purchase price and the life-cycle costs). 
Performance was evaluated in the context of a typical mission: in 
winter, at night, a scramble take-off from a road runway, air 
surveillance and target acquisition, interception beyond the visual 
range, a dogfight, break-off, navigation to base, landing, rearming 
and refuelling. The various parts of the mission were weighted 
differently, of course, with beyond visual range (BVR) interception 
ability by far the dominating factor. 
The clear winner in the competition proved to be the F/A-18 
Hornet, which was successful in all areas, its BVR capability and 
firepower with an AMRAAM AIM-120 missile load being especially 
impressive. Cost factors were also favourable, since economy of 
scale had proved its worth, given high production figures and a 
large user family. 
A Letter of Intent was signed on 6th May 1992 and the offset 
agreement on 19th May 1992. The government made its purchase 
decision on 4th June of the same year, and the Letter of Acceptance 
was signed on 5th June. Thus the massive evaluation and negotiation 
task had been carried through in three years. There were two things 
in particular which gained respect in the international feedback: 
adherence to the preplanned schedule, and completion of the type 
selection process without any media leaks. The key to success lay in 
the detailed, comprehensive specification, which had demanded a 
great deal of effort at the time but subsequently effectively eliminated 
any loose ends or extra iteration cycles. 
The total package included 7 two-seater F/A-18 Ds and 57 
single-seater F/A-18 Cs with the new AN/APG-73 radar, new 
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and more powerful F404-GE-402 engines, plus AMRAAM AIM-
120 radar missile and Sidewinder AIM-9M infra-red missile 
armament. The two-seaters were delivered directly from 
McDonnell Douglas and were flown from St. Louis to Finland in 
November 1995 and February 1996, while the F/A-18 C fighters 
and their engines are being assembled in Finland by Finavitec 
Ltd, formerly Valmet Aviation Ltd. The first delivery was made 
in summer 1996, and they will continue in the same pace as the 
older fighters are withdrawn from service, so that the entire 
fighter fleet will have been renewed by the year 2000. 
The doctrine of the FAF has been streamlined by both its 
war experiences and its peace-time resource limitations. Air 
superiority, or rather the ability to deny the adversary air 
superiority, was put forward as the most important factor for the 
protection of strategic targets and for front line operations, and 
thus air combat capability is priority number one among the 
various alternative mission areas. 
On the other hand, Finland has never invested in defence 
at the expense of other governmental responsibilities, in fact the 
contrary has tended to be the rule, so that the resources available 
for defence have traditionally been modest. There is one benefit 
that has arisen out of this; that the limited resources have allowed 
no margin for political speculations and have created a long-
range stability which has enabled continuous upward progress 
to be made. This in turn has been an important contributor to the 
morale and motivation of the personnel. In any case, any attempt 
to build up a miniature superpower air force with such resources 
would have led to ineffective assortments of aircraft types and 
mission priorities, whereas by concentrating the system entirely 
on the most important mission it has been possible to build up a 
force which also has some quantity effect in that specialized 
field. This simplifies both training and material administration 
and development, and dictates certain clear-cut priorities for 
recruiting. The pilot selection system recruits a new pilot group 
each,  year, on a ratio of one to every 40 - 50 applicants. They all 
are selected and trained as fighter pilots, backed up by a small 
supporting cadre of former fighter pilots. Individuals with a 
background as a fighter pilot also make up a considerable 
proportion of the ground controllers. 
One fairly original feature of the FAF are the fact that the 
fighter wings operate two aircraft types. This both improves 
pilot training and reduces the overall costs. Every fighter wing 
also has a Hawk squadron, which gives new pilots full air combat 
manoeuvre training after their basic and advanced training at 
the Air Academy and before they move on to the fighters. At the 
same time, this arrangement permits continuous air combat 
training with different types of aircraft, the "Red Flag" being 
carried on the wings on a daily basis within the fighter squadrons. 
The instructors in the Hawk squadrons, being qualified fighter 
pilots themselves, can quickly show the newcomers the correct 
air combat principles and alternatives. 
The Finnish anti-aircraft organization for the peace-time 
training of reserves and the systems development is as follows: 
- Anti-aircraft Department, HQ for Defence Forces 
Helsinki 
- Helsinki Anti-aircraft Regiment 	 Tuusula 
- Varsinais-Suomi Anti-aircraft Regiment 	Turku 
- Kymi Anti-aircraft Regiment 	 Hamina 
- Lapland Anti-aircraft Regiment Rovaniemi 
- Armoured Anti-aircraft Battery 	 Parola 
- Anti-aircraft School 	 Tuusula 
- Anti-aircraft Battery, Reserve Officers' School Hamina 
The organizational anti-aircraft units in the Army, Air Force 
and Navy are equipped with the following surveillance, control 
and weapon systems:18 
- Target Acquisition Radar m-95 Giraffe 100 
- Target Acquisition Radar m-87 Giraffe 75 
- Regiment Control Centre m-90 
- Battalion Target Acquisition Centre m-87 
- Battery and Platoon Air Situation Display System 
- NVS 12.7 mm machine gun 
- 23 ItK 61 23 mm cannon 
- 30 ItK 62 30 mm cannon 
- 35 ItK 88 45 mm cannon 
- 40 ItK 36-59 40 mm cannon 
- 57 ItK 60 57 mm cannon 
- Tank ItPsv SU-57 57 mm cannon 
- Tank ItPsv 90 Marksman 35 mm cannon 
- Shoulder Missile ItO-78 (Strela) 
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- Shoulder Missile ItO-86 (Igla) 
- Missile System ItO-91 Mistral 
- Missile System ItO-90 Crotale 
- Missile System ItO-79 Pechora 
The Finnish Anti-aircraft System can be divided into two 
components: the control system and the weapons system. The 
control system is integrated nationwide, and information passes 
to and fro between the air force control centres and posts and the 
anti-aircraft control and weapon units. Fire control on a resource 
and safety basis is the responsibility of the air force within the air 
defence fire control system, and basic shooting techniques and 
tactics that of the regimental control centres in the strategic target 
areas and the battalion control centres in the army units. The key 
functional components are the air surveillance system, the air 
situation display system and the communications or signals 
system. Tactical management follows the operational order of 
battle.18 The weaponry consists of gun and missile systems, which 
are categorized into close-range, medium-range, or target 
protection, and long-range, or area protection systems. The anti-
aircraft system comprises all of these components at present, and 
most of them are modern.18 
The Commander of the Air Force is responsible for the air 
defence of Finland. In effect, he wears two hats: 
- In the Defence Staff he is the Air Defence Commander 
and the Commander-in-Chief's air specialist, who handles the 
deployment of air defence and anti-aircraft assets nationwide 
within the strategic target structure, the air commands and the 
military commands. 
- As the Commander of the FAF he has his headquarters, 
operations centre, air commands and the rest of the organization 
to maintain peace-time operational readiness, training and 
material functions and to execute the Air Force's mission in 
wartime. 
The commanders of the air commands work in cooperation with 
those of the military command to coordinate air, ground and 
naval assets and use them at the right time and in the right place 
according to mutually and jointly prepared plans. The Inspector 
of Anti-aircraft Defence at the Defence Staff is responsible for 
the materials development and the training of anti-aircraft troops 
in all branches. He is an assistant to the Air Defence Commander 
at the Defence Staff. 
There have been no radical changes in expectations 
regarding air defence in Finland. The majority of the air 
surveillance and control system has been modernized, and the 
programme will continue by building up redundancy in the 
sensor and data transfer systems. 
The new fighter fleet will remain in service for many decades 
after the turn of the century. One of the benefits of the new Hornet 
system is the user family's common philosophy of continuous up-
dating of the fighter. The two-year cycle of new operational computer 
programmes guarantees continuous availability of the latest 
weapons, electronics and other systems. The look-down shoot-
down capability and the BVR fire-and-forget firepower, able to 
handle the cruise-missile and multi-target environment, are, of 
course, the main assets of the new fighter. But the overall multi-role 
versatility of the aircraft also is most important. 
The post-war Achilles' heel of Finnish air defence has been 
the lack of systems for offensive counter air operations. Even 
now, for economy reasons, only air defence weaponry was 
purchased. From the systems standpoint, however, the situation 
is now entirely different. Extensive, time-consuming modifications 
would have been needed earlier in order to install new weapon 
systems in fighters, but now the Hornet system is immediately 
ready to use a wide variety of specified stand-off missiles ideally 
suited for offensive counter air operations. Thus the achievement 
of a rapid, marked improvement in the overall effectiveness of 
the fighter system is now only a question of money and not of 
systems capability. 
The Hawk fighter trainer will obviously be fitted with a new, 
more durable "combat wing" in the early 2000s, and some kind of 
mid-life cockpit update is possible after another twenty years or so, 
but before that a small number of support planes of various kinds 
and about 30 elementary trainers will be replaced with new aircraft 
types. 
The organization is rationalized by transferring the fixed 
wing aircraft of the transport squadron from Utti to Tikkakoski, 
and will be combined with the reconnaissance squadron to form 
the support wing. The helicopter squadron stayed in Utti, and 
became an army unit. 
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In the anti-aircraft sector the ItO-79 area protection missiles 
are becoming obsolescent, and a preliminary survey of potential 
replacements has been carried out, showing that appropriate 
alternatives could be found from several sources. There was one 
financial advantage, combined with system performance, which 
tipped the balance in the direction of the Russian BUK-M1 system, 
namely Russia's debt to Finland, inherited from the era of bilateral 
trading, which amounts to about 8 billion marks, a certain small 
proportion of which has been earmarked for offsetting against 
arms supplies. Russia has a long tradition as a developer of a 
multitude of anti-aircraft missile systems, so that this system in 
any case represented the best choice for the defence forces. Also, 
the above funding solution allowed the old system to be replaced 
ahead of schedule, delivery taking place at present. 
Norway 
The peace-time organization of the RNAF is as follows 
(Figure 2):31  
Headquarters, Huseby, Oslo 
Northern Norway Air Command 
- Helicopter Squadron 330, A Flight, Bodö, B Flight, Banak 
- Helicopter Squadron 337, Bardufoss 
- Helicopter Squadron 339, Bardufoss 
- Fighter Squadron 331, Bodö 
- Fighter Squadron 334, Bodö 
- Maritime Squadron 333, Andoya 
- Liaison Squadron 719, Bodö 
Southern Norway Air Command 
- Helicopter Squadron 330, C Flight, Orland, D Flight, 
Stavanger-Sola 
- Fighter Squadron 332, Rygge 
- Transport Squadron 335, Oslo-Gardemoen 
- Fighter Squadron 336, Rygge 
- Fighter Squadron 338, Orland 
- Helicopter Squadron 720, Rygge 
- Primary Flying School and Cadet School, Trondheim- 
Värnes 
- Technical School, Kjevik 
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The peace-time strength of the RNAF is about 9,500 persons, and 
the total number of aircraft about 150, including 59 F-16 A/B fighters 
and 15 F-5 A/Bs. Its war time strength is about 34,000, supplemented 
by an Air Force Home Guard of 2,500 men organized into ten air 
defence batteries.12 
Nato has already been working for several years on building 
up a new early warning, surveillance and control system to replace 
the NADGE system, but due to the changing international situation 
the budget has been cut back markedly. This means that work on 
Norway's network of 14 stations has also slowed down. The majority 
of the infrastructure has in any case been completed. Ten new 3-D 
HADR middle-range radar systems have been purchased to replace 
the older equipment, and these have been located mainly on the 
coast, so that they also participate in marine surveillance. The long-
range radars from the 1960s are to be replaced with the new Nato 
system at the turn of the century. 
The Norwegian air surveillance and control system works in 
dose cooperation with Nato, USAF and British AWACS planes 
flying over the Norwegian Sea, although the intensity of flights has 
decreased since the USA closed down the AWACS unit at Keflavik. 
Nowadays mainly Nato and British aircraft are continuing the 
operations, with Örland as their Forward Operating Location (FOL) 
in Norway. Renewal of the fighter fleet is now entering the planning 
stage. The mid-life update (MLU) of the F-16 A/B fighters scheduled 
for 1996-2000 has just begun, and this should prolong their service 
life to about 2020. The lifetime of the modified F-5 aircraft will 
obviously come to an end before that, and so they will inevitably be 
a part of the renewal process. 
The evaluation work started with the Rafale, Eurofighter 
2000, JAS, F-16 C/D block 50 plus, F-18 C/D and F-18 E/F 
fighters as the preliminary candidates. The original plan is to 
acquire 48 aircraft to replace the old F-5 A/B force and the F-16 
A/B fighters that have been lost. Deliveries should take place in 
2003 or 2004. The current F-16 A/B squadrons are to be replaced 
with new aircraft in the period from 2015 to 2018. 
the main weapon of the RNAF F-16s is the AIM-9L 
Sidewinder, and without the AIM-7 Sparrow, the aircraft are 
basically clear weather fighters. The MLU program will give 
them an all-weather capability, with missiles such as the AIM-
120 AMRAAM or MICA. 
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The anti-ship weapon currently deployed is the Norwegian 
Penguin P-3 missile, but the longer-range P-4 is under 
development. The main ground attack weapon is the AGM-65 
Maverick and the anti-radar arsenal consists of AGM-45 Shrike 
and AGM-88 HARM missiles. 
The main mission of the RNAF is air defence, to secure the 
arrival and deployment of specific Nato units in Norway in 
order to begin operations. A secondary mission for the fighters is 
anti-ship warfare with the Penguin missiles. The long coastline 
and vast, open sea area introduce maritime and transportation 
obligations, which are reflected in the number of anti-submarine 
Orion P-3Cs and helicopters. 
About 40 trainee pilots are accepted each year, and after 
primary training in Norway, they receive their advanced training 
in the USA. The trainees are divided into four categories: fighter 
pilots, transport pilots, helicopter pilots and navigators. After 
the training in the USA, which takes from 11 to 16 months 
depending on the category, a period of 3-5 months of tactical 
training is provided at Rygge. After this the pilots are stationed 
in their squadrons for possible type courses followed by normal 
service training." 
The Nike Hercules anti-aircraft area protection missile batteries 
around Oslo have been taken out of commission lately, and some of 
the Norwegian Adapted Hawk (NOAH) target protection missile 
batteries are obviously being used to replace them. Norway carried 
out the NOAH modification by combining the Improved Hawk 
system with the Acquisition Radar and Control System (ARCS) fire 
control centre by Konsberg. The main mission of the present six 
NOAH battalions is to protect air bases such as Andoya, Bardufoss, 
Bodö, Evenes, Värres and Orland.32 Norway was the first country 
to adopt an active anti-aircraft missile system. This is based on 
AMRAAM missiles, and two of the first units have already been 
delivered. The remaining four units are expected to be in operational 
use by 1997. One battery consists of three platoons, each having 3 
launchers with 6 missiles, so that the battery has a total of 54 
missiles. These Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System 
(NASAMS) batteries will use mobile Hughes AN/TPQ-36A target 
acquisition and fire control radar devices combined with ARCS fire 
control centres. Their main mission will obviously be to protect the 
air bases. 
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The short-range anti-aircraft units were equipped during 
1991-1994 with the Swedish RBS-70, which replaced the Bofors 
L/60 40 mm anti-aircraft guns. These units now form the main 
bulk of the army anti-aircraft system, although light cannons and 
machine guns are also used as short range anti-aircraft weapons 
in the army units. There are anti-aircraft battalions in Rygge, 
Gardemoen, Lista, Sola, Orland, Värnes, Bodö, Bardufoss and 
Andoya, anti-aircraft batteries in Langenes, Evenes and Torp, 
reserve battalions in Fornebu and Flesland, and reserve batteries 
in Kjevik and Bodö.12 
The Chief Inspector of Air Defence is the head of the Air 
Force and is responsible for organization, tactical and material 
development, flight safety and personnel administration. 
Operational responsibility extends through the military 
commands, and the air commands are subordinated to these. 
The same holds good for anti-aircraft defence, the Chief Inspector 
of Air Defence being the head of the anti-aircraft troops, with the 
similar responsibilities as for the Air Force. The structure of 
operational responsibility is also similar." 
The role of Nato plays a major part in Norwegian thinking 
and expectations for the future. The overall decrease in military 
spending within the Nato organization will place more of a 
burden on the national defence contribution. One example is the 
formidable system of bases, which will need substantial resources 
if it is to be maintained at its original planned size. 
On the other hand, the extensive and highly important 
Russian military concentration in the Kola region will mean that 
the northern flank of Nato will never fall out of focus in the 
planning of air assets. The types of aircraft which Nato plans to 
deploy in Norway in times of crisis include: 
- Tornado and Jaguar reconnaissance aircraft 
- A-10 close support and anti-tank aircraft 
- F-16 and F/A-18 multirole fighters 
- F-15 and Tornado ADV interceptors 
- Tornado IDS attack aircraft 
- AV-8B and Harrier close support aircraft 
- EA-6B electronic warfare planes 
- C-130 transports 
- C-135 tankers. 
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The total amount of Nato support amounted earlier to about 300 
planes but the expected number is now somewhere around 200 
or less. 
If a carrier force group were deployed in the Norwegian 
Sea it would bring 80 or 160 more aircraft onto the scene, 
depending on the number of carriers. These would include: 
- E-2C Hawkeye AWACS aircraft 
- S-3A Viking surveillance and anti submarine aircraft 
- F-14 Tomcat interceptors 
- F/A-18 Hornet multi-role fighters 
- A-6E and A-7E attack aircraft 
- KA-6D tankers 
- EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft 
The carrier force can be supported by P-3 Orion surveillance and 
anti-submarine aircraft flying from Great Britain and Iceland. 
Other aircraft such as the F-117, F-111F, F-15E, B-1B, B-2 
and B-52 can occasionally be used on the northern flank as well, 
without being based in Norway. The anti-aircraft weapons 
possessed by the Nato support forces include the TPS-59/HAWK 
Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile system, Rapier, Chaparral-Vulcan, 
possibly Patriot, and also Shorts Javelin shoulder-launched 
missiles. 
Norwegian Army anti-aircraft defence will be in the hands 
of air defence battalions equipped with RBS-70 short-range 
missiles and 20 mm cannons, controlled by Mobilradar control 
centres and Siemens weapon terminals. These belong to the 
Norwegian Army Low Level Air Defence System (NALLADS).18 
The anti-aircraft defence of air bases will be divided into 
three categories. The first will comprise a NASAMS battery, L70 
batteries and a RBS-70 battery combined with four ARCS centres, 
the second a NASAMS battery and a RBS-70 battery combined 
with four ARCS centres, and the third one RBS-70 battery and 
two ARCS centres.18 
Russia 
The peace-time air force and air defence organizations in the 
north-western area of Russia are as follows:31 
76 Air Army (Figure 3) 
- Headquarters, St. Petersburg 
- 239 Fighter Division, Viitana 
- 159 Fighter Regiment, Viitana 
- 28 Fighter Regiment, Andreapol 
- 149 Bomber Division, Gdov 
- 722 Bomber Regiment, Gdov 
- 67 Bomber Regiment, Siverski 
- 98 Reconnaissance Regiment, Monchegorsk 
- 277 Helicopter Squadron, Taibola 
- 138 Support Regiment, Levashovo 
The aircraft types include Su-27, MiG-29, Su-24, MiG-25, Su-17, 
Mi-8, Mi-6, An-12, An-26 and An-30, and amount in total to 
about 90 fighters, 80 bombers and 60 reconnaissance aircraft, 
altogether about 230 aircraft and 35 helicopters. 
6th Air Defence Army (Figure 4) 
- Headquarters, St. Petersburg 
- Air Defence Corps, St. Petersburg 
-180 Fighter Regiment, Sakkola 
-177 Fighter Regiment, Lotinapelto 
- Air Defence Corps, Murmansk 
-174 Fighter Regiment, Monchegorsk 
- 941 Fighter Regiment, Murmansk 
- 470 Fighter Regiment, Afrikanda 
- Air Defence Corps, Arkangelsk 
- 518 Fighter Regiment, Talagi 
- 548 Fighter Regiment, Kotlas 
The aircraft types include MiG-31, Su-27 and MiG-25, the total 
number of fighters being about 200. 
Army Air Force of the Northern Military District (Figure 5) 
- Headquarters, St. Petersburg 
- 6th Army 
- Attack Helicopter Regiment, Alakurtti 
- Transport Helicopter Regiment, Alakurtti 
- Helicopter Squadron, Taibola 
- Heavy Transport Helicopter Squadron, Römpötti 
67 
- 30 Army Corps 
- Attack Helicopter Regiment, Kasimovo 
The helicopter types include Mi-8, Mi-24 and Mi-6, a total of 
about 200 helicopters. 
Northern Navy Air Force (Figure 6) 
- Headquarters, Murmansk 
- Carrier Division, Kuznetsov 
- Fighter Regiment 
- Attack Regiment 
- Helicopter Regiment 
- Training Regiment, Murmansk 
- Support Helicopter Squadron, Support Ships 
- Anti-Ship Attack Division, Olenia 
- Anti-Ship Attack Regiment, Olenia 
- Anti-Ship Attack Regiment, Arkangelsk 
- Attack Regiment, Olenia 
- Reconnaissance Squadron, Severomorsk 
- Transport Regiment, Pechenga 
- Maritime Surveillance and Anti-Submarine Division 
- MSAS Regiment, Severomorsk 
- MSAS Regiment, Kipelovo 
- AS Helicopter Regiment, Murmansk NE 
The aircraft types include Su-33, Su-25K, Su-27, Su-25, Tu-26, 
MiG-27, Su-24E, An-12, An-26, I1-38, Be-12, Tu-95D, Tu-142F, Ka-
27 and Ka-25. The total number of aircraft is about 250 and that 
of helicopters about 50. 
Baltic Navy Air Force (Figure 7) 
- Headquarters, Kaliningrad 
- Transport Squadron, Krabrovo 
- Bomber Regiment, Chkalovsk 
- Bomber Regiment, Chernyakhovsk 
-Fighter Regiment, Nivenskoye 
- Maritime Surveillance and Anti-Submarine Regiment 
The aircraft types include Su-24, Su-27, An-12, I1-38, Be-12, Ka-
25/27, Ka-32 and Mi-14, numbering about 130 aircraft and about 
30 helicopters in all. 
The Northern Military District can be supported by the 
Transport Division in Novgorod, with I1-76 transports, and by 
the Long-Range Air Force with its Tu-26, Tu-160, Tu-16 and Tu-
95H planes. More support can be arranged from the 16th Air 
Army in the Moscow Military District and the Moscow Air 
Defence Army. 
In the immediate wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in December 1991, the Soviet Air Force relatively quickly reverted 
from a system with some 20,000 pilots and 13,000 aircraft to a 
new organization of 13,000 pilots and 5000 aircraft.35 Under the 
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Russia is authorized 
to maintain 3,450 fixed-wing combat aircraft, 890 armed 
helicopters and 300 naval aircraft west of the Ural Mountains.31  
The disintegration of the Soviet Union meant major changes 
in the country's air defence. The transfer of enormous masses of 
equipment from the former Warsaw Pact countries and Baltic 
nations, combined with the scrapping of old material and 
relocation of newer material in the various depots, required a 
considerable logistic effort. These arrangements for the 
redeployment of troops and material were mainly carried out in 
1994. 
At this same time efforts have been going on to modernize 
and automate the air surveillance and control system. There is 
still much work to be done, but the programme is aimed at 
creating a new computer-based display and data transfer system. 
The air defence district is divided into sectors with their 
own air defence corps. These are responsible for air surveillance 
and intelligence, fighter defence and anti-aircraft defence in their 
respective areas. 
The radio brigades are responsible for air surveillance and 
intelligence in each air defence sector. Each air defence corps has 
two or three brigades of this kind, and each brigade has from 
three to five radio battalions, each normally with two to four 
radar companies. The radar equipment is mostly modern, the 
majority of it having been introduced in the 1980s or 1990s. The 
most difficult part will probably be modernization of the signals 
network, and the building up of a hand-operated digital transfer 
network of the necessary magnitude will take many years and a 
large amount of resources. 
The AWACS Mainstay aircraft forms the mobile part of the 
air surveillance and control system, and is connected to the air 
defence corps network through its data transfer system. The 
Ilyushin A-50 Mainstay has undergone a continuous cycle of 
modifications and probably about 20 planes are currently in use. 
The production line may be discontinued, but no information on 
a possible successor has yet been released. 
The composition of the Russian air forces is tending to 
follow the international trend for a decrease in both the total 
number of aircraft and the range of types. Almost all the older 
types such as the Su-15, Tu-126, MiG-27, MiG-23, Su-17, Tu-16 
and Tu-22 were in the process of being phased out in the early 
1990s, and the main categories of combat aircraft are now:31  
Fighters 
- Su-27, MiG-31 and MiG-29 
Attack aircraft 
- Su-24D and Su-25 
Bombers 
- Tu-26/Tu-22M, Tu-95 and Tu-160 
Reconnaissance aircraft 
- Su-24F/E and Tu-26 
Only 23 new aircraft were purchased altogether in 1993 - 1994 
and only one type of combat aircraft, the Su-27, was evidently in 
production in 1995. None were budgeted for 1996.46 Frontal 
Aviation has shrunk from a high of over 5000 combat aircraft in 
1989 to less than half that number today. Of these, around a third 
are fourth-generation MiG-29s and Su-27s. If current budget 
trends continue, Frontal Aviation's holdings, by its own estimate, 
will decline from 2280 to 1440 combat aircraft in 2000. The Air 
Force leaders have stated that because of cash shortages, the first 
priority in fighter force enhancement would be Su-27 
modifications, including the Su-35 air superiority fighter and Su-
32/34 two-seat all-weather strike aircraft, as well as a 
reconnaissance variant and a much needed ECM/EW version.46 
The Air Defence Force has experienced a rate of decline 
much like that of the other combat air arms since the late 1980's. 
From a high of some 2300 interceptors it is down to less than half 
that number today. Force modernization plans appear limited to 
developing and producing an advanced MiG-31, if and when 
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procurement authorizations permit.46 The Air Force has done its 
best to sustain Mikoyan's new I-42 or MiG-37 fighter program 
but has admitted that it would be "not soon" when it would 
come to fruition.46 
One problem for Russian strategic aviation has been the 
loss of about half of its bombers to the Ukraine, especially 15 Tu-
160 bombers representing 65% of its fleet of that type. The 
negotiations between the two countries have resulted in the 
return of ten of these at a reasonably equitable price.46 
Development plans also exist for a new model, the Su T-60s 
middle-range supersonic bomber. 
Strategic transport aviation has experienced similar 
problems to those affecting the bomber wing. About 30% of the 
11-76 transport aircraft remained in the Ukraine, as well as the 
majority of the factories producing their parts. The oldest types, 
the An-12 and An-22, will reach the end of their service life in ten 
years, but if new types are not produced, the lack of air 
transportation will be one of the most serious factors limiting the 
application of Russia's new military doctrine. The small number 
of tankers will also limit combined long-range operations, as the 
current tanker fleet is almost entirely occupied with strategic 
bomber operations. The Air Force leadership has stated that the 
present priority number one in military aviation is the air transport 
capacity.46 
A joint project exists with the Ukraine to build a transport 
aircraft, the An-70, to replace the An-12. This was planned to go 
into production early in 1990, but the programme has been 
delayed. The only heavy transport aeroplane being produced in 
Russia at the moment is the An-124, to replace the old An-22s 
and some of the I1-76s. There are about 50 An-124s now in use. 
The present tankers, of the 11-78 Midas model, are based on 
the I1-76 transport airframe. No information is available about 
the continuity of production, but there is an obvious need for 
more tankers. The I1-78 can refuel types such as the Tu-95, Tu-
160, Su-24, Su-27, MiG-31 and their variants. 
The Mi-24 and its various versions represent the main 
attack helicopter currently in use in Russia, but there are two 
candidates to replace it, the Mi-48 and Ka-50. The service life of 
the Mi-24 will come to an end somewhere around 2005, so that 
production of its successor should begin fairly soon. 
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The basic weapon of the strategic bomber force is the AS-15 
cruise missile, with a range of 2500 km. This can carry either a 
nuclear or a conventional warhead. An additional weapon is the 
AS-16 Kickback short-range attack missile, which is designed to 
eliminate the defence strongholds. A new cruise missile, the AS-
19, is in the initial development phase. 
The main weaponry for the Tu-26M2 Backfire B bombers 
consists of aerodynamic AS-4/6 missiles, which have a range of 
300-400 km. These are designed for use against both land and sea 
targets. The long-range Tu-26M3 Backfire C bombers can be 
equipped with AS-16 ASM missiles in addition to the AS-4/6 
missiles. The conventional bomb load for the Tu-26 bombers is 
about 20 tons. 
The main attack aircraft type, the Su-24, has a Kaira-24 
laser and TV sighting system, and its maximum external load of 
8100 kg can be made up of a wide variety of weapons e.g. :31 
- laser-guided bombs KAB-500L 
- conventional HE bombs FAB-100, FAB-250, FAB-500 
- incendiary bombs ZAB-500Sh 
- retarded runway-cratering bombs BetAB 
- duster dispensers RBK-180 or RBK-250 for PTAB-2 or PTAB-
5 anti-armour bomblets 
- rocket pods S-8KO with 20 x 80 mm rockets or S-13 with 5 x 
130 mm rockets 
- gun pods SPU-6 housing 23 mm GSh-23 twin-barrel cannon 
and 260 rounds of ammunition 
- air-to-surface missiles Kh-23M AS-7 Kerry, Kh-25 AS-10 
Karen, Kh-29 AS-14 Kedge, Kh-31P AS-17 Krypton, Kh-
58E AS-11 Kilter, Kh-59 AS-13 Kingpost 
The main weapons for the interceptors are the semi-active radar 
missiles AA-9 and AA-10. A new active radar missile, AA-12, R-
77, was introduced in 1994. Two new active, obviously anti-
AWACS, long-range radar missiles are being planned: the R-37, 
with a range of 150-300 km, and the KS-172, with a range of 400 
km. These two may prove to be rivals, competing for the same, at 
the moment uncertain development resources. The main infra-
red missile is the R-73, which can be used with a helmet sight. 
The Mi-24 attack helicopter's main weaponry consists of a 
portable gun, missiles and rockets. The use of rockets is decreasing 
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and the use of missiles correspondingly increasing. The use of 
air-to-air missiles as a form of self-defence armament will be 
increased in the future. 
The military air organizations of Russia inherited about 
60% of the Soviet Union's combat aircraft and 40% of its air 
bases,33 and the basic organizational structure remained initially 
more or less the same, the obligation to carry out operations far 
away from the homeland tending to prevail among the various 
categories of mission. A three-step reorganization plan was then 
established to carry out:33 
- an analysis of the status and resources of the air forces in 
1992 
- reception of units from aboard and introduction of a new 
organization in 1995 
- balancing of the functions of the combat air support units 
in the new organization from 1995 onwards. 
Respect for air power seems to be on the increase in Russia, 
especially after the results of the Gulf War. The then Chief of the 
General Staff Academy, now the Minister of Defence, Colonel 
General Igor Rodionov, said in a speech in spring 1992 that any 
future war will be fought with airborne weapons.34 At the same 
time, however, resources are diminishing, and therefore some 
severe cuts in priorities among the mission categories are to be 
expected. Also, the inertia of the old Soviet system, which 
routinely favoured strategic missiles and armour, is still slow to 
die. Aviation equipment accounts for only 12-15% of Russia's 
arms purchases, in contrast to an asserted 25-30% in the United 
States, whose major combined operations have been successes.35 
Actually, the proportion of the budget allotted to air resources is 
frequently used nowadays as a yardstick to measure the 
effectiveness of the defence systems of different countries. If the 
percentage of air resources is low, the defence forces will not be 
capable of modern warfare but will be oriented towards either 
internal security missions or guerilla warfare. Or worse, they 
may be making Iraqi-type false investments in a capability for 
conventional warfare. 
Throughout most of the cold war, the Soviet Air Force 
operated a specialized undergraduate pilot training program 
consisting of a dozen Higher Military Aviation Schools for Pilots. 
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The new system entails initial flight orientation in secondary 
boarding schools, followed by screening and selection for a five-
year undergraduate pilot training program, with flight training 
solely on the L-39. Now cadets receive three years of classroom 
academic instruction. Only afterward it is determined whether 
they will continue on to the flying phase, which is now 
compressed into two years rather than spread out over three as 
before. Of the twelve original undergraduate pilot training 
schools, the Air Force now operates only four.46 
A certain decrease in the number of applicants has been 
noted due to changes in service conditions. The commandant of 
the former Kharkov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots 
(VVAUL), for example, noted that where 790 applicants were 
accepted in 1989, only 312 entered the programme in 1990. It was 
common in the early 1970s for six to eight applicants to vie for 
each available pilot training slot nationwide, but today one finds 
a maximum of 1.5 applicants competing for each position. On the 
other hand, there is no shortage of pilots at the present moment 
relative to the number of aircraft, because the radical reduction 
in the latter means that certain units have as many as five pilots 
queuing for one aircraft.35 This, combined with the high price of 
fuel, has cut the annual number of flying hours per pilot down to 
an alarmingly low level. 
The anti-aircraft defence system includes: 
- Space Defence Troops 
- Air Defence Anti-aircraft Troops 
- Army Anti-aircraft Troops 
- Naval Anti-aircraft Troops 
Anti-aircraft fire is coordinated by the control centre of each Air 
Defence Sector, and all anti-aircraft troops in the sector are 
subordinated to that organization. The basic organizational unit 
is the anti-aircraft missile brigade, which establishes a centre to 
control the fire of its own units, the separate units in the area and 
the army anti-aircraft units. Both air defence and the army 
organizations have anti-aircraft missile brigades, which are 
deployed so that only one brigade is responsible for each area 
and controls the fire of all the units in that area. 
The air defence missile brigades have the Baikal-1E control 
system and the army missile brigades the Polyana-4E system, 
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allowing them to communicate with neighbouring brigades, the 
air defence corps Universal-1E centres and Mainstay AWACS 
aircraft. 
The main weapons of the air defence anti-aircraft missile 
brigades are the SA-5 long-range missile and the SA-10 multi-
purpose missile. There are several versions of the SA-5, which is 
a semi-active radar missile with a range of 200-300 km and a 
cruise speed of 3-4 mach. The system is basically moveable, but 
the majority of the arsenal is obviously deployed in fixed, fortified 
positions. A brigade normally has a group of 2-5 battalions belong 
to it, and target acquisition is normally carried out by the brigade 
control centre radar. Every battalion has its own fire control 
radar. 
The SA-10 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles 
(excluding intercontinental and middle-range missiles), aircraft 
and cruise missiles. One of the missile types is optimized for 
anti-missile functions. The range of the older missiles, designed 
for aerodynamic targets, is 100 km, while the newer types have a 
range of 150 km. The height coverage is 30 km and the top speed 
of the missile 6-7 mach. The anti-aircraft missile brigade has 1-3 
SA-10 battalion groups, each normally of 3 battalions. Each 
battalion group has 2 target acquisition radars, a 3-D multi-
purpose radar and a CW radar optimized for low flying targets. 
Each battalion has its own CW target acquisition radar and 
a pulsed doppler fire control radar equipped with an electronically 
phase-arrayed antenna. For anti-missile capability, a brigade must 
be equipped with a special target acquisition radar, also with an 
electronically phase-arrayed antenna. This is obviously not yet 
standard equipment in all brigades. 
The older, massively deployed SA-2 and SA-3 systems are 
gradually being phased out, but they will probably remain on 
the inventory until after the turn of the century. The SA-2 and 
SA-3 battalions are deployed as separate units under direct control 
of the brigade control centres. They are evidently not connected 
to the brigades' automatic Baikal-1E control systems. 
the army anti-aircraft missile brigades are equipped with 
SA-4, SA-6/11, SA-12 or SA-10 missile systems. The SA-4 system 
is old and will probably be abandoned entirely fairly soon, while 
the SA-6/11 is a kind of hybrid system in which an attempt has 
been made to rectify certain fire control limitations and multi- 
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target functions in the SA-6 system by means of the combined 
use of SA-11 launchers. Both missiles have a range of about 30 
km. The SA-12 Gladiator/Giant system S-300V was obviously 
intended originally to replace the army anti-aircraft missile 
brigades' SA-4 and SA-6/11 systems, but it is possible that the 
SA-10, S-300PMU1, will become the main equipment for the 
army units as well. 
The anti-aircraft missile regiments of the mechanized 
infantry divisions are equipped with either SA-8 or SA-6 missile 
systems. These will be replaced, probably in some ten years, with 
SA-15 or SA-18 missile systems, which are under development. 
Both are typical short-range systems. The anti-aircraft missile 
battalions of the mechanized infantry regiments are mainly 
equipped with SA-9 and SA-13 systems, and both will be replaced 
later with a new SA-19 system. 
The Russian Air Force as a branch has been mainly an 
administrative organization, its combat units being subordinated 
to other branches. The Strategic Air Force, with its missile-
equipped bombers, operates as a part of the Strategic Forces, 
while the main mission of the Frontal Air Force was to provide 
tactical air support for the army forces, and the air armies and 
tactical bombers of Long-Range Aviation were subordinated to 
the military districts. Only the Transport Air Force was 
operationally subordinate to the Air Force Commander at times 
of crisis. However, recently constituted Frontal Aviation 
Command (KFA) operates and maintains all tactical aircraft in 
the Air Force inventory. Its establishment withdrew Russian 
fighter aviation from immediate ownership of the regional 
military district commanders, long the practise troughout the 
Soviet era, and reassigned it to the Air Force.46 
The Air Defence Air Force is independent and directly 
subordinated to the Ministry of Defence, at least at present, but it 
is subordinate logistically to the Air Force. 
The Naval Air Forces have common maintenance systems 
with the Air Force at various coastal bases, but operationally 
they are subordinate to the navies. The leadership of the Air 
Force has initiated an effort to simplify and concentrate the 
operational use of the country's air assets, as the current system 
of forces, divided vertically into branches and horizontally into 
districts, is ill-prepared for dynamic, high-tempo air operations. 
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The traditional organizational resistance naturally prevails, however, 
and the additional vision of several local conflicts having to be 
handled simultaneously may have had its own effect on the planning 
process.36 
The future prospects of Russian military aviation are not 
good in the short-term, due to the lack of resources. Many of the 
new projects will have to be postponed or even rejected and the 
modernization process will be slower than expected. Combined 
with the difficulties in recruiting and shortages in training hours, 
this will mean turbulent times for the leaders of the various aviation 
branches. The massive initial size of the force structure nevertheless 
offers opportunities for making sensible cuts within well established 
priorities and for extracting greater efficiency from the remaining 
capabilities by streamlining the overall command organization. 
Sweden 
The peace-time deployment plan of the Flygvapnet for the year 
1997 is as follows (Figure 8):31,43 
F 4, Östersund 
-2 JA 37 divisions 
F 7, Såtenäs 
-1 JAS division 
-1 AJS 37 division 
- transport division 
F 10, Angelholm 
-1 AJS 37 division 
-1 J 35 division 
- SK-60, basic flying training 
- Ground Schools; technical, base 
F 16, Uppsala 
-2 JA 37 divisions 
F 17, Ronneby 
-2 JA 37 divisions 
F 21, Kallax 
-1 AJS 37 division 
-2 JA 37 divisions 
Uppsala Schools; officers, air surveillance and control, 
interpreters, signals, meteorology 
77 
The force has about 110 attack and reconnaissance aircraft, about 
190 fighters, and about 70 SK 60 Saab 105 trainers. The peace-
time personnel is about 8500 and the wartime strength about 
70,000. In addition to the air force organization, there is a 
formidable air force department in the Defence Materials 
Establishment (FMV). 
The long-range radar equipment of the air surveillance 
system was renewed in the 1980s, incorporating modern 3-D 
technology, and renewal of the short-range radar systems is now 
in progress. The old tower-installed radar scanners from the 
1960s will be replaced with new Falcon systems. 
The optical air surveillance system was written off on 1st 
July 1994, and will obviously be phased out according to the 
pace of the material rejection. It has been partly replaced by the 
LOMOS system, which based on equipment acquired during a 
crisis, has been developed to reach the operational stage within a 
couple of years.37,31 The new system reduces the optical air 
surveillance personnel from some 15,000 to under 6,000. 
An air surveillance and control aircraft, the Saab 340 AEW/ 
FRS 890 or S 100B Argus, has been under test since July 1994, and 
six are to be purchased. The fleet is expected to be operative in 
four or five years. The plane will carry only pilots and sometimes 
a technical operator, but most of the operators will work on the 
ground via a data link system. The antenna is installed to cover 
both sides of the aircraft by means of an electronically phase-
arrayed technology.43 
The oldest Drakens and Viggens will be phased out before 
the turn of the century, but a certain number of Viggens are 
being modified as AJS 37 multi-role fighters, to be replaced later 
with JAS aircraft. 
Surveys aimed at replacing the Viggen fighters began in 
the 1970s, and when the B3LA project was abandoned in 1979, 
the idea of a multi-role fighter capable of flying fighter, attack 
and reconnaissance missions was officially included in the plans. 
The possible alternatives were:39 
- purchase of a foreign fighter 
- construction of a foreign fighter in Sweden under licence 
- construction of a fighter in cooperation with one or more 
foreign manufacturers 
- construction of a Swedish fighter, but with a larger 
proportion of foreign systems than previously to keep down 
the cost 
The recommendation of the defence committee was to build the 
Swedish JAS (Jakt, Attack, Spaning) Gripen aircraft to replace 
the Viggens in the early 1990s and to produce 140 of these before 
the year 2000. 
Parliament approved the proposal in 1982 and an agreement 
was signed between FMV and the JAS Industry Group on 30th 
June 1982. The first production batch of 30 aircraft was ordered 
in April 1983 and the first prototype was unveiled on 11th 
February 1986. 
The recommendation regarding foreign systems led to 
incorporation of the following:40  
- Flight control system, product series 1, Lear Astronics, USA 
- Flight control system, product series 2, Martin Marietta, USA 
- Basic engine F404 	 General Electric, USA 
- Air conditioning control 	Hymatic Engineering,UK 
- Landing gear 	 AP Precision Hydraulics,UK 
- APU and engine start aggregator Microturbo, France 
- Emergency power and transfer Lucas Aerospace, UK 
- Inertia navigation 	 Honeywell, USA 
- Cannon 	 Mauser-Werke, Germany 
- Ejection seat 	 Martin Baker, UK 
- Main generator Sundstrand, USA 
- Hydraulic system and transfer Dowty, UK 
- Brakes 	 Aircraft Breaking Systems, USA 
- Fuel system 	 Intertechnique, France 
The first flight was on 9th December 1988, but the prototype was 
destroyed in a landing accident on 2nd February 1989 on account 
of shortcomings in the flight control system. 
Test flights started again in May 1990, and the second 
batch of 110 aircraft was ordered in June 1992. The first production 
aircraft, JAS 39.102, was delivered on 8th June 1993, but this 
crashed at an air show on 8th August in the same year, again due 
to shortcomings in the flight control system. Test flights were 
continued on 29th December 1993 and the next production 
delivery to FMV took place in March of 1995. The current 
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production programme is planned to be completed in 2002. As 
noted above, the first Viggens to be replaced by the JAS 39A 
Gripen are those of the attack type, whereas the last Viggen 
fighters are expected to been withdrawn in 2010.40 
The weaponry of the JAS (two wing-tip positions for IR 
missiles plus four under-wing and two under-fuselage strong 
points) consists of:" 
- Fixed 27 mm Mauser cannon 
- Two Sidewinder AIM-9L infra-red missiles 
- Maverick Rb 75 air-to-ground missiles 
- Bofors M70 rocket pods 
- Rb 15F anti-ship missiles 
- DWS 39 Dispenser Weapon System 
- Active radar missiles 
The evaluation for active air-to-air radar missiles was carried out 
between the following candidates: 
- AMRAAM AIM-120, USA 
- MICA, France 
- Active Sky Flash, UK 
The decision to buy a small number of the American AMRAAM 
AIM-120 active radar missiles in order to continue development 
of the JAS fighter version was made in 1994. 
The traditional objective of the post-war Flygvapnet has 
been to push the defensive circle beyond the country's boundaries 
by virtue of quantity and a fairly high proportion of attack aircraft. 
During the years of decreasing resources, when the number of 
the aircraft was reduced to about 30% of the figures for 1945 and 
the number of personnel to about 50%, the percentage of fighters 
increased. Eventually the dedicated attack wing was abolished 
on ist July 1996. It is envisage that a new multi-purpose aircraft 
will allow continued flexible variation of the proportions of the 
various mission categories. 
The yearly intake of trainee pilots has also been reduced, 
the earlier figures of 100-150 having been adjusted to the smaller 
number of units. After the phases of basic and advanced training, 
there are type introduction courses and then separate training 
for fighter, attack and reconnaissance pilots in their respective 
mission areas. After the introduction of the JAS system every 
pilot will divide his flight hours among these three mission 
categories. 
The modernized Hawk Rb 77 anti-aircraft missile battalion 
has been in the use since the 1970s and was modified in 1994 by 
addition of a mobile launcher system. Its main mission is to 
protect the capital city. 
The army units have their own organic anti-aircraft systems, 
the main weapon being the RBS-70 anti-aircraft missile. A 
modified system, the RBS-90, based on laser guidance, was 
introduced in 1991. It is highly jam resistant and its only 
shortcoming is that it is not capable of all-weather operation. 
There are over 100 RBS units in existence, and in addition to the 
army units, it is used to protect air bases and other important 
targets. 
Many of the automatic anti-aircraft artillery batteries are 
equipped with radar-guided 40 mm guns. The Super-Fledermaus 
fire control systems are in the process of being replaced by PEAB 
radar systems. In addition, there are anti-aircraft machine guns 
and 20 mm cannons for use as short-range troop anti-aircraft 
weapons.'8 
The anti-aircraft fire control system is integrated into the 
national air defence control system Stril-90. The basic structure 
of the anti-aircraft defence's own target acquisition radar system 
is derived from various versions of the Ericsson Giraffe.18 
A major change in the organization of the defence forces 
was made in Sweden on ist July 1994, in which the earlier 
independent branch commanders and staffs were combined into 
one headquarters to form the production administration 
departments. The country is divided into three military regions, 
North, Central and South, and the combat flying units are 
subordinate to the military commands of these regions. National 
operational responsibility lies with the operations department at 
headquarters, and areal responsibility with the area 
commanders. 
The future prospects of Sweden's air defence are very much 
oriented towards the renewal of its combat aircraft system. The 
JAS system is planned to be ready in 2006, a new infra-red air-to-
air missile is to be acquired during the development phase and a 
reconnaissance pod for the JAS 39 Gripen should be ready by the 
year 2001.40 
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The changeover from AJS 37 Viggens and J 35 Drakens to 
JAS 39 Gripens is scheduled to take place in 1997-2001, and the 
change from the Viggen JA-37 fighters to the JAS planes is 
scheduled to begin in 2001. The light attack system SK 60 has 
been cancelled, but the material will be stored and kept at the 
ready.43 The SK 60 Saab 105 trainers will be fitted with new 
engines, and the S 102B Korpen signal surveillance system will 
be operative in 1998.43 
Development of the ground control system will be 
continued, but the original planned number of ten StriC control 
centres will be reduced to five. The flying air surveillance and 
control system FSR 890, two groups of three S 100 Argus aircraft, 
is planned to be ready by the turn of the century.43 
The contemporary reductions, already taken into account 
in the organization list, are F 15 at Söderhamn, the target squadron 
in Malmen, the F 5 flying school at Ljungbyhed and the Halmstad 
schools.43 There is an estimation that 4 or 5 wings (flottilj) would 
be the final number.47 
The next development phase in terms of anti-aircraft defence 
will be the Bamse Rb 23 anti-aircraft missile, obviously a boosted 
version of the RBS 90 system, with an increased range.43,18 
CONCLUSIONS 
All of the countries examined here can be included among the 
nations which are aware of the importance of air power and have 
typically devoted continuous efforts to keeping their air defence 
assets up to date. Their historical and economic backgrounds 
have naturally left a definite mark on the air defence solutions 
adopted by each. 
Finland's Air Force was created in the midst of the War of 
Independence, and prompt action was needed. This eliminated 
effectively any administrative jealousies. The principle of 
establishing it as an independent branch of the armed forces 
therefore seemed natural. 
In Norway the advances made in aviation technology were 
fairly soon taken into the service of the already existing Army 
and Navy organizations, an arrangement which, once established, 
was naturally quite difficult to dissolve. Thus this organizational 
principle continued up to the Second World War. 
In Russia, military aviation was initiated by the Imperial 
Army well before the First World War and was substantially 
extended during the war. Activities were interrupted by the 
Bolshevik revolution, but importance was soon attached to it by 
the Soviet regime as well. The Air Force as organization was 
nevertheless confined to a subordinate status in the Party-Army 
hierarchy. 
Military aviation had very similar beginnings in Sweden as 
it did in Norway, but the question of an integrated air organization 
was resolved sooner, and thus an independent air force was 
established seven years after the First World War. 
Anti-aircraft artillery started out as an Army function in all 
of these countries. It was then transferred to the Air Force in 
Finland and Norway, but in the case of Finland it returned to the 
Army after the Second World War. In the Soviet Union it became 
part of the independent air defence branch, while in Sweden it 
has always been the responsibility of the Army. 
The early development phase in Finland was characterized 
by sound plans but inadequate implementation. Motivation 
towards armed defence was high among the people, as shown 
by the voluntary training undergone by the Home Guard and 
the Air Defence Association. On the other hand, the political will 
for material investments in defence remained low even during 
the threatening years of the late 1930s. Thus the well balanced 
programme was suddenly exchanged for a series of emergency 
aircraft purchases once the Winter War had broken out. 
The special needs of the Army and Navy very much dictated 
the early development of their respective air corps in Norway, 
which did not provide an ideal basis for building up a national 
air defence doctrine or acquiring the proper equipment. 
In the Soviet Union the subsequent pattern of development 
was dominated by a big country's ambition for big numbers, 
with the Army very much dictating the organizational philosophy, 
doctrine and material development of air assets. 
Quite detailed development objectives were laid down in 
Sweden after the founding of the Flygvapnet. International 
douhetism with very heavy bomber priorities was in evidence in 
these plans. But the necessary resources were not granted in 
Sweden, either, and the organization was poorly equipped when 
military activity started to break out in the neighbouring countries. 
The lessons of the war for Finland were straightforward 
enough: 
- There was no quarantee in counting on foreign help, the 
country has to be ready to face any challenge alone. 
- One can fight successfully even against apparently 
impossible odds given sufficient determination and quality. 
Norway experienced occupation by the Germans and then 
liberation under the allied forces. Thus the NATO alliance was a 
natural choice for the country's post-war defence arrangements. 
The Soviet Union failed to reach its objectives on the north-
western front in both the Winter War and the Continuation War, 
but even after the heavy losses inflicted by Germany it was able, 
as part of the allied forces, to occupy eastern Central Europe. The 
extremely deep area of defence, a heavy emphasis on quantity 
and the importance of international support from allies were 
among the main war lessons. As a result, the Warsaw Pact 
organization and the steering of industry towards military 
production were the Soviet Union's defence solutions after the 
war. 
Sweden had a ringside seat, as it were, for watching the 
war raging around the country. The natural reaction was to build 
up a preemptive force to maintain the country's neutrality and 
keep it out of any crisis. 
The post-war development of air defences in Finland was 
characterized by a modernization programme which started out 
rather slowly but then pressed forward steadily. A certain amount 
of progress has been made also in matters of quantity, and this 
overall build up has been an important motivator in terms of 
both recruitment and job satisfaction. 
Norwegian air defence programmes have been part of the 
NATO build-up, and have advanced accordingly. Now, with the 
ending of the Cold War, there have been signs of reduced alliance 
commitments on the northern flank. This will shift the emphasis 
more onto national initiatives and programmes, although the 
NATO system will no doubt maintain a high level of integrity. 
The Soviet Union's massive air defence build-up has given 
way to substantial reductions in present-day Russia, brought 
about by the implementation of international agreements and 
the economic situation in the country. A certain quality shift can 
be perceived in this reduction process, as it is inevitably being 
concentrated on older equipment. There seem to be notable 
difficulties in initiating new projects, however, and the quality of 
training is also suffering at present. 
The extensive air defence development programme carried 
through during and after the war in Sweden culminated in the 
1960s, after which the first signs emerged that the system was 
becoming too expensive to maintain. This marked the beginning 
of reductions, which are planned to continue in the future. These 
have been carried out gradually and in a controlled manner over 
a long period of time, and thus there has been no dramatic 
downgrading of the status of the Swedish air defence. Actually, 
the effect among the personnel must have been more 
psychological, as they have seen many traditional units and 
functions disappear. 
the contemporary air defence organization in Finland is 
based on the lessons learned in the war. The limited manpower 
resources of a small nation, matched with the need to maintain a 
good level of manning in combat units, have eliminated the 
multi-layered areal staff system with its large liaison personnel. 
Each branch has its own operational, material and training 
responsibilities, and decisions are made without delay at most 
professional levels. This system emphasizes effectiveness and calls 
for good cooperation between the commanders in the various 
branches. It was applied during the critical summer of 1944 and 
worked well. 
Norway's air defence structure is part of the NATO joint 
command system and is organized accordingly. The readiness to 
adapt to major changes in force levels is one of the capabilities 
needed in the allied management environment. 
Russia has divided its air defence resources vertically into 
branches and horizontally into districts. An initiative has originated 
from the air force to streamline the organizations and concentrate 
the deployment of forces. This is an expected objective in the effort 
at rationalization in context of the major post-Soviet transformation. 
Sweden has a tradition of areal commands with units that 
serve well to cover the entire country. The numbers of both areas 
and units have decreased, but the original organizational principle 
persists. Air assets are administered in two organizations; personnel 
and training in the Air Force Department and material and 
equipment in the Defence Materials Establishment (FMV). The 
Commander of the Air Force has initiated an effort to streamline the 
command structure towards a more flexible and effectiveness-
oriented type; actually very much to the same which is used in the 
Finnish Air Force 49 
There are many sectors of air defence which have not been 
touched upon in this review. One is electronic signals surveillance, 
which is an important part of the total air surveillance system. All of 
the countries in question have their unique solutions in that area, 
and also seem to assign it fairly high priority in every organization. 
Another is the system of bases, which very much dictates the 
flexibility of air operations. This has been considered carefully in 
every country and certain national or allied characteristics are visible 
in these structures. Finland and Sweden use their wide areas of 
countryside and make use of public roads as landing strips, whereas 
Norway and Russia favour large bases with a high input of local 
resources. 
The aviation industries in all these countries have designed 
and produced original aircraft types, and have also built many 
foreign designs under licence. Differences in national philosophies 
have begun to develop in this respect since World War II, 
however. In Finland the home market was estimated to be too 
small to support continued economic production of fighter-class 
aircraft, whereas the war had shown the importance of 
autonomous maintenance, repair and modification capabilities. 
Thus the aviation industry is integrated into the Air Force's 
technical system, constituting a vital part of it. 
In Norway the equipment received from NATO gave no 
room for local production, and the aviation industry was adjusted 
to support the allied technical organization. 
In the days of the Soviet Union the aviation industry was a 
part of superpower competition, and this meant that considerable 
resources were devoted to it. In present-day Russia, however, with 
declining order books, a kind of survival game is going on in the 
aircraft industry, although it is dear that there will be some survivors. 
In Sweden, large domestic orders gave a good basis for the 
development and production of tailor-made aircraft types on a 
national basis, but gradually the economic burden has become 
heavier, so that the cost structure of the JAS 39 Gripen project has 
aroused a national debate. The government and the military are 
nevertheless committed to the JAS. 
It is obvious that there will be only three instances capable of 
genuine fighter development and production in the future: the 
USA, Russia and some kind of European cooperation group. 
The importance of air power, and accordingly that of air 
defence, has aroused many traditional attitudes in leadership circles. 
The major strategic and operational lessons from the Gulf war are 
as follows:50 
- Strategic attack works 
- If a nation loses air superiority, it is at the mercy of its 
attackers; its military operations are highly circumscribed 
- Surface forces are vulnerable and fragile 
- Surface operations in the face of enemy air superiority are 
almost impossible 
- Precision and stealth redefine mass and concentration 
- Asymmetric attack works and gives huge advantages to 
the attacker 
- Air forces can defeat large surface forces by themselves 
- A static force takes longer to destroy from the air than a 
mobile force 
- Rapid exploitation of information is essential 
- Standard hierarchial organization is not conductive to rapid 
processing and exploitation of information 
- Airpower has become the dominant force in war. 
Many observers look askance of airpower because they believe it 
costs too much. To the contary, high tech airpower is extraordinary 
cheap when the cost is measured against the results. The only 
measure which makes sense today is the effect one can produce 
on the opposition. And nothing can match airpower when the 
accounting is done correctly.5° 
Competent politicians and officers have realized the nature 
of the modern dynamic conflicts, and many air defence 
modernization programmes can be seen to be in process in 
northern Europe. Modern material and equipment of good quality 
is essential in the extremely unforgiving arena of aerial warfare, 
but the most important force multiplier continues to be carefully 
selected, well motivated and thoroughly trained combat-ready 
personnel. The key factor for any country is to maintain steady 
standards of personnel quality and to ensure this by means of 
good training with a diversity of exercises and plentiful flight 
hours. Any country that is capable of this can look to the future 
with confidence. Certain material improvements can be made 
once a conflict has started, but personal skills must be available 
at once. Only the winners will be there to continue the fight, as 
coming in second in an aerial engagement means loss, and the 
ability to continue air combat with success is a necessity for total 
defence. 
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